Order by South Carolina Supreme Court
 The Supreme Court of South Carolina 
 
 
RE: 	 Administrative Suspensions for Failure to Pay License Fees Required 
by Rule 410 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules (SCACR) 
 
 
________ 
 
________ 
 
 
 
  
  
 
 
O R D E R 
The South Carolina Bar has furnished the attached list of lawyers (including 
those holding a limited certificate to practice law) who have failed to pay 
their license fees for 2015. Pursuant to Rule 419(d)(1), SCACR, these 
lawyers are hereby suspended from the practice of law. They shall surrender 
their certificate of admission to practice law to the Clerk of this Court by 
April 6, 2015. 
Any petition for reinstatement must be made in the manner specified by Rule 
419(e), SCACR. Additionally, if they have not verified their information in 
the Attorney Information System, they shall do so prior to seeking 
reinstatement.
These lawyers are warned that any continuation of the practice of law in this 
State after being suspended by this order is the unauthorized practice of law, 
and will subject them to disciplinary action under Rule 413, SCACR, and 
could result in a finding of criminal or civil contempt by this Court. Further, 
any lawyer who is aware of any violation of this suspension shall report the 
matter to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel. Rule 8.3, Rules of Professional 
Conduct for Lawyers, Rule 407, SCACR. 
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 s/ Jean H. Toal  C.J. 
 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones  J. 
 
s/ Donald W. Beatty  J. 
 
s/ John W. Kittredge  J. 
 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn  J. 
 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
March 4, 2015 
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Members Who Have Not Paid 2015 License Fees 
Candice Leah Armstrong 

59 Cross Pointe 

Greenville, SC 29607 

Roberts Joseph Bradford Jr.
 
817 West Walnut Street, Suite 12 

Johnson City, TN 37604 

D. Allen Calhoun 

1801 S. Bell St. 

Arlington, VA 22202 

Stephen Edward Carter 

19 Shelter Cove Ln., Ste. 100 

Hilton Head Island, SC 29928-3574 

Kevin Peter Corrigan 

12 Larnes Street 

Apt. D 

Charleston, SC 29403 

W. Richard Cox 

5320 Bridgers Road Ext, Ste 4 

Shallotte, NC 28470 

Jacob Alexander Crawford 

1304A Grove St. 

Charlottesville, VA 22903 

D. Kerry Crenshaw 

500 Woodward Ave., Ste. 3500 

Detroit, MI 48226-3435 

Joanmarie Ilaria Davoli 

8787 Bay Pine Rd. 

Jacksonville, FL 32256 

Kimberlee Joanne De Biase 

2260 NE 52nd Street 

Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33308 

Roberta Lynn Diamond 

PO Box 35763 

Brighton, MA 02135 

Susan Johnsen Flynn 

1401 Canal Point Rd 

Longwood, FL 32750-4550 

Kristin Leigh Gatter
 
932 Burnley Rd. 

Charlotte, NC 28210 

Joel F. Geer 

330 E. Coffee Street 

Suite 1047 

Greenville, SC 29601 

Christopher Matthews Glenn 

3232 Danfield Drive 

Columbia, SC 29204 

Susan Moody Gritton
 
2212 Shannon Dr 

Murfreesboro, TN 37129-1312 

Robert J. Hermeston 

215 Green Valley Rd 

Anderson, SC 29621 

Elizabeth Council Hogue 

49 Fisher Crse 

Ocklawaha, FL 32179-5722 

Robert L. Joga 

100 Kingsley Park Drive 

Fort Mill, SC 29715 

S. Matthew Lilly Jr.
 
131 N. Market St. 

Washington, NC 27889 

James Andrew Lund 

1401 Hampton Street 

Columbia, SC 29201 

Riche' Terrance McKnight 

200 Park Avenue 

New York, NY 10166 

3 

  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Misti Karlene Meyers 

309 S Third St 

PO Box 552610 

Las Vegas, NV 89155 

Emily Jackson Miller
 
PO Box 8294 

Ann Arbor, MI 48107 

Thomas Edward O'Neill 

151 Westpark Blvd. 

Columbia, SC 29210 

William A. Pollard Sr.
 
104 Catawba Circle 

Columbia, SC 29201 

Shannon Marie Postell 

16 Ashmore Place Drive 

Columbia, SC 29229 

Rebecca D. Ramos 

115 State Street 

Montpelier, VT 05633-5401 

Christopher R. Richmond 

40 W. Cayuga St. 

Oswego, NY 13126 

Gretchen Aynsley Rogers 

1803 Hampton Street, 2nd Floor 

Columbia, SC 29201 

Timothy Wayne Ryan 

555 Poyntz Ave., Ste. 290 

Manhattan, KS 66502 

Harriett Jean Twiggs Smalls 

PO Box 14391 

Greensboro, NC 27415 

Jason Bailey Sprenkle 

437 Captains Cir. 

Destin, FL 32541 

Gene Stockholm 

1031 Center Street 

West Columbia, SC 29169 

Virginia C. Tate
 
1550 Peachtree St.
 
Atlanta, GA 30309 

Susan Hill Terry
 
61 Forsyth Street Suite 20T10 

Atlanta, GA 30303 

Julian H. Toporek 

221 W. York St. 

Savannah, GA 31401 

Karen Marie Utter 

412 Ivy Green Lane 

Lexington, SC 29072 

Nicole Vouvalis 

0175 Old Main Hill 

Logan, UT 84322 

Jonathan Pellett Weitz 

38 Center Street 

PO Box 302 

Folly Beach, SC 29439 

John Paul Wilkins 

6 Arbor Way Drive 

Decatur, GA 30030 

Lee Ann M. Williams
 
3 Windlass Court 

Savannah, GA 31411 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina
In the Matter of Andrea Hall Duenas, Petitioner 
Appellate Case No. 2015-000335 
ORDER 
The records in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court show that on , 
Petitioner was admitted and enrolled as a member of the Bar of this State. 
By way of a letter addressed to the South Carolina Supreme Court, dated 
February 19, 2015, Petitioner submitted her resignation from the South 
Carolina Bar. We accept Petitioner's resignation. 
Petitioner shall, within fifteen (15) days of the issuance of this order, deliver 
to the Clerk of the Supreme Court her certificate to practice law in this State.
In addition, Petitioner shall promptly notify, or cause to be notified, by 
certified mail, return receipt requested, all clients currently being represented 
in pending matters in this State, of her resignation. 
Petitioner shall file an affidavit with the Clerk of the Supreme Court, within 
fifteen (15) days of the issuance of this order, showing that she has fully 
complied with the provisions of this order.  The resignation of Andrea Hall 
Duenas shall be effective upon full compliance with this order.  Her name 
shall be removed from the roll of attorneys. 
s/ Jean H. Toal C.J. 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones J. 
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s/ Donald W. Beatty  J. 
 
s/ John W. Kittredge  J. 
 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn  J. 
 
Columbia, South Carolina 
 
February 25, 2015 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina
In the Matter of Elizabeth P. Paul, Petitioner 
Appellate Case No. 2015-000307 
ORDER 
The records in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court show that on , 
Petitioner was admitted and enrolled as a member of the Bar of this State. 
By way of a letter addressed to the South Carolina Supreme Court, dated 
February 19, 2015, Petitioner submitted her resignation from the South 
Carolina Bar. We accept Petitioner's resignation. 
Petitioner shall, within fifteen (15) days of the issuance of this order, deliver 
to the Clerk of the Supreme Court her certificate to practice law in this State.
In addition, Petitioner shall promptly notify, or cause to be notified, by 
certified mail, return receipt requested, all clients currently being represented 
in pending matters in this State, of her resignation. 
Petitioner shall file an affidavit with the Clerk of the Supreme Court, within 
fifteen (15) days of the issuance of this order, showing that she has fully 
complied with the provisions of this order.  The resignation of Elizabeth P. 
Paul shall be effective upon full compliance with this order. Her name shall 
be removed from the roll of attorneys.
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s/ Jean H. Toal C.J. 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones J. 
s/ Donald W. Beatty J. 
s/ John W. Kittredge J. 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn J. 
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Columbia, South Carolina 
February 25, 2015 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Supreme Court of South Carolina
In the Matter of Patricia A. Small, Petitioner 
Appellate Case No. 2015-000314 
ORDER 
The records in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court show that on May 
10, 1999, Petitioner was admitted and enrolled as a member of the Bar of this 
State. 
By way of a letter addressed to the Supreme Court of South Carolina, dated 
February 19, 2015, Petitioner submitted her resignation from the South 
Carolina Bar. We accept Petitioner's resignation. 
Petitioner shall, within fifteen (15) days of the issuance of this order, deliver 
to the Clerk of the Supreme Court her certificate to practice law in this State.
In addition, Petitioner shall promptly notify, or cause to be notified, by 
certified mail, return receipt requested, all clients currently being represented 
in pending matters in this State, of her resignation. 
Petitioner shall file an affidavit with the Clerk of the Supreme Court, within 
fifteen (15) days of the issuance of this order, showing that she has fully 
complied with the provisions of this order.  The resignation of Patricia A. 
Small shall be effective upon full compliance with this order.  Her name shall 
be removed from the roll of attorneys.
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s/ Jean H. Toal C.J. 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones J. 
s/ Donald W. Beatty J. 
s/ John W. Kittredge J. 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn J. 
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Columbia, South Carolina 
February 25, 2015 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Supreme Court of South Carolina
In the Matter of Keith Robert Thornburg, Petitioner 
Appellate Case No. 2015-000298 
ORDER 
The records in the office of the Clerk of the Supreme Court show that on 
November 13, 2007, Petitioner was admitted and enrolled as a member of the 
Bar of this State. 
By way of a letter addressed to Supreme Court of South Carolina, dated 
February 19, 2015, Petitioner submitted his resignation from the South 
Carolina Bar. We accept Petitioner's resignation. 
Petitioner shall, within fifteen (15) days of the issuance of this order, deliver 
to the Clerk of the Supreme Court his certificate to practice law in this State.
In addition, Petitioner shall promptly notify, or cause to be notified, by 
certified mail, return receipt requested, all clients currently being represented 
in pending matters in this State, of his resignation. 
Petitioner shall file an affidavit with the Clerk of the Supreme Court, within 
fifteen (15) days of the issuance of this order, showing that he has fully 
complied with the provisions of this order.  The resignation of Keith Robert 
Thornburg shall be effective upon full compliance with this order.  His name 
shall be removed from the roll of attorneys. 
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s/ Jean H. Toal C.J. 
s/ Costa M. Pleicones J. 
s/ Donald W. Beatty J. 
s/ John W. Kittredge J. 
s/ Kaye G. Hearn J. 
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Columbia, South Carolina 
February 25, 2015 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Supreme Court of South Carolina 

DANIEL E. SHEAROUSE POST OFFICE BOX 11330
CLERK OF COURT COLUMBIA, SOUTH CAROLINA 29211 
BRENDA F. SHEALY
CHIEF DEPUTY CLERK 
TELEPHONE:  (803) 734-1080
FAX:  (803) 734-1499
N O T I C E 
IN THE MATTER OF DAVID ROSS CLARKE,  
PETITIONER 
Appellate Case No. 2015-000268
Petitioner was disbarred from the practice of law.  In the Matter of Clarke, 
290 S.C. 494, 351 S.E.2d 573 (1986). Petitioner has now filed a petition 
seeking to be readmitted.
Pursuant to Rule 33(e)(2) of the Rules for Lawyer Disciplinary Enforcement 
contained in Rule 413 of the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules, notice is 
hereby given that members of the bar and the public may file a notice of their 
opposition to or concurrence with the petition.  Comments should be mailed 
to: 
    Committee on Character and Fitness 
P. O. Box 11330 
    Columbia, South Carolina 29211 
These comments should be received within sixty (60) days of the date of this 
notice. 
Columbia, South Carolina
March 2, 2015
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Supreme Court 

Jeffrey D. Allen, on behalf of Jane Doe, Appellant, 
v. 
South Carolina Public Employee Benefit Authority, 
Employee Insurance Program, Respondents. 
Appellate Case No. 2012-212988 
Appeal from the Administrative Law Court 

Shirley C. Robinson, Administrative Law Judge
 
Opinion No. 27504 

Heard December 5, 2013 – Filed March 4, 2015 

REVERSED 
Terry E. Richardson, Jr., of Richardson, Patrick, 
Westbrook & Brickman, LLC, of Barnwell,  and John A. 
Massalon, of Wills Massalon & Allen, LLC, of 
Charleston, for Appellant. 
Theodore D. Willard, Jr., of Montgomery Willard, LLC, 
and Stephen Van Camp, both of Columbia, for 
Respondent. 
CHIEF JUSTICE TOAL: Jeffrey D. Allen (Appellant), on behalf of his 
daughter, appeals the Administrative Law Court's (ALC) order affirming the 
Appeals Committee of the South Carolina Budget and Control Board Employee 
Insurance Program's (EIP Appeals Committee) decision to deny Appellant's 
23 

  
 
 
 
   
 
 
                                                            
 
 
 
 
 
 
insurance claim for his daughter's diabetes educational training session.  We 
reverse. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Appellant, a South Carolina public school district employee, is insured under 
the Group Health Benefits Plan of the Employees of the State of South Carolina, 
the public school districts, and participating entities (the State Health Plan).1  The 
State Health Plan is offered through EIP.2 
In November 2007, Appellant's daughter was diagnosed with Type 1 
diabetes at the age of two years old.3  Appellant's daughter's doctor prescribed her 
an insulin pump to regulate her insulin levels.  In August 2008—two weeks prior 
to attaching the pump to Appellant's daughter's body—her family and two school 
nurses attended a two-hour training session at the Medical University of South 
Carolina, during which a diabetic educator taught the caregivers how to operate the 
insulin pump.   
Appellant submitted a $560 claim for the educational training session.4  Blue 
1 The State Health Plan was created by the South Carolina Budget and Control 
Board (SCBCB) pursuant to section 1-11-710 of the South Carolina Code, which 
requires the board to "make available to active and retired employees of this State 
and its public school districts and their eligible dependents group health, dental, 
life, accidental death and dismemberment, and disability insurance plans and 
benefits in an equitable manner and of maximum benefit to those covered within 
the available resources." S.C. Code Ann. § 1-11-710(A)(1) (Supp. 2013). 
2 SCBCB created EIP to administer the State Health Plan.  Recently, a newly 
created agency, the South Carolina Public Employee Benefit Authority (PEBA), 
assumed administration of EIP pursuant to Act No. 278, 2012 S.C. Acts 2278, 
2319.
3 Appellant's daughter is insured as a dependent under Appellant's State Health 
Plan policy. 
4 Appellant also submitted a claim for his daughter's insulin pump, which was 
covered by his policy. 
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Cross Blue Shield of South Carolina (Blue Cross) denied the claim on the grounds 
that the "benefit plan does not cover education and/or training for this condition."5 
Appellant appealed the denial through Blue Cross's appeals process.  Ultimately, 
Blue Cross's Appeals Review Committee upheld the denial of benefits on the basis 
that diabetes educational training is excluded under the State Health Plan, and that 
section 38-71-46 of the South Carolina Code,6 which mandates coverage for 
diabetes educational training in certain health insurance policies, does not apply to 
the State Health Plan. 
Appellant appealed to the EIP Appeals Committee.  The EIP Appeals 
Committee denied Appellant's claim, concluding that Appellant's State Health Plan 
policy expressly excluded diabetes educational training and that section 38-71-46 
did not apply to the State Health Plan.   
Appellant appealed to the ALC.  In the ALC, Appellant argued that diabetes 
educational training is covered under the State Health Plan,7 and in the alternative, 
the State Health Plan should be reformed to comply with section 38-71-46.  
Additionally, Appellant requested that the ALC allow the matter to proceed as a 
class action lawsuit. On August 13, 2012, the ALC issued an order affirming the 
EIP Appeals Committee's decision that the terms of the State Health Plan do not 
cover diabetes educational training because the State Health Plan does not qualify 
as "health insurance coverage" as defined by the South Carolina Code.8  In light of 
the ALC's disposition of the case, the ALC declined to address whether it had the 
authority to permit the case to proceed as a class action.    
Appellant appealed the ALC's order to the court of appeals.  This Court 
certified the appeal pursuant to Rule 204(b), SCACR. 
5 Blue Cross is the third-party claims administrator for the State Health Plan.  As 
such, Blue Cross processes and pays claims under the State Health Plan and thus, 
provides the first level of review for coverage requests. 
6 S.C. Code Ann. § 38-71-46 (2002).
7 Appellant has now abandoned this argument. 
8 For a health insurance policy to be subject to section 38-71-46, it must provide 
"health insurance coverage" as defined by section 38-71-840(14) of the South 
Carolina Code. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 38-71-46, -840(14) (2002). 
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ISSUES
I.	 Whether the ALC erred in concluding that section 38-71-46 
does not apply to the State Health Plan? 
II.	 Whether the ALC erred in failing to address the availability of 
class action relief? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
A party who has exhausted all administrative remedies available within an 
agency and who is aggrieved by an ALC's final decision is entitled to judicial 
review. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-380 (Supp. 2012).  In an appeal from a decision by 
the ALC, the Administrative Procedures Act (APA) provides the appropriate 
standard of review. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-23-610(B) (Supp. 2012).  Under the 
APA, this Court will reverse an ALC's decision if it is: 
(a) in violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;  
(b) in excess of the statutory authority of the agency; 
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; 
(d)affected by other error of law; 
(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative, and substantial 

evidence on the whole record; or 

(f) arbitrary or capricious or characterized by an abuse of discretion or 

clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.   

Id.  A question of statutory interpretation is one of law for this Court to decide.  
CFRE, L.L.C. v. Greenville Cnty. Assessor, 395 S.C. 67, 74, 716 S.E.2d 877, 881 
(2011) ("Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law, which we are 
free to decide without any deference to the court below." (citing City of Rock Hill 
v. Harris, 391 S.C. 149, 152, 705 S.E.2d 53, 54 (2011))). 
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LAW/ANALYSIS
I. Applicability of Section 38-71-46 to the State Health Plan 
Appellant argues that the ALC erred in concluding that section 38-71-46 of 
the South Carolina Code does not apply to the State Health Plan.  We agree. 
"All rules of statutory construction are subservient to the one that the 
legislative intent must prevail if it can be reasonably discovered in the language 
used, and that language must be construed in the light of the intended purpose of 
the statute." Kiriakides v. United Artists Commc'ns, Inc., 312 S.C. 271, 275, 440 
S.E.2d 364, 366 (1994) (citing Bohlen v. Allen, 228 S.C. 135, 141, 89 S.E.2d 99, 
102 (1955)). "'What a legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the best 
evidence of the legislative intent or will.'" Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 86, 533 
S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000) (quoting Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory 
Construction § 46.03 at 94 (5th ed. 1992)).  When interpreting a statute, the Court 
must read the language in a sense which harmonizes with its subject matter and 
accords with its general purpose. Eagle Container Co., L.L.C. v. Cnty. of 
Newberry, 379 S.C. 564, 570, 666 S.E.2d 892, 896 (2008) (quoting Hitachi Data 
Sys. Corp. v. Leatherman, 309 S.C. 174, 178, 420 S.E.2d 843, 846 (1992)).   
Section 38-71-46 of the South Carolina Code mandates coverage for 
diabetes education in "every health maintenance organization, individual and group 
health insurance policy, or contract issued or renewed in this State . . . ."  S.C. 
Code Ann. § 38-71-46(A) (emphasis added).  For purposes of the mandate, group 
policy "health insurance coverage" is defined as: 
benefits consisting of medical care provided directly, through 
insurance or reimbursement, or otherwise and including items and 
services paid for as medical care under any hospital or medical service 
policy or certificate, hospital or medical service plan contract, or 
health maintenance organization contract offered by a health 
insurance issuer . . . . 
S.C. Code Ann. § 38-71-840(14) (2002) (emphasis added).9 
We do not read "health care issuer" as modifying all preceding clauses in
9 The statute further provides a list of exceptions.  S.C. Code Ann. § 38-71-
840(14). None of the exceptions are applicable here.   
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subsection (14). Benefits need not be provided by a "health care issuer" to qualify 
as "health insurance coverage" under section 38-71-840(14).  Therefore, based on 
the plain language of section 38-71-840(14), the ALC erred in finding that the 
State Health Plan does not provide "health insurance coverage."   
Instead, the words "and including"  in section 38-71-840(14) indicate that 
the General Assembly intended the statute's definition to be read in two parts, 
notwithstanding the list of exclusions.  The first part of the definition provides that 
health insurance coverage is defined as benefits consisting of medical care 
provided:  (1) directly through insurance; (2) directly through reimbursement; or 
(3) provided otherwise. S.C. Code Ann. § 38-71-840(14).  After "and included," 
the definition is expanded to include "items and services paid for as medical care 
under:" (1) any hospital or medical service policy or certificate; (2) any hospital or 
medical service plan contract; or (3) any health maintenance contract offered by a 
health insurance issuer. Id.  Therefore, the plain language of the statute does not 
require health insurance coverage to be offered by a "health insurance issuer."  To 
conclude otherwise results in a tortured and illogical reading of the statute.  See 
Browning v. Hartvigsen, 307 S.C. 122, 125, 414 S.E.2d 115, 117 (1992) ("A 
statute as a whole must receive a practical, reasonable, and fair interpretation 
consonant with the purpose, design, and policy of the lawmakers.").   
Section 38-71-46 is entitled "Diabetes Mellitus coverage in health insurance 
policies; diabetes education." We find that the General Assembly's choice of title 
and use of the word "every" in section 38-71-46(A) indicates that, indeed, it 
intended to mandate coverage for "every health maintenance organization, 
individual and group health insurance policy, or contract issued or renewed in this 
State . . . ." See S.C. Code Ann. § 38-71-46(A) (emphasis added).  Nowhere in the 
plain language of section 38-71-46 does the General Assembly exclude—explicitly 
or implicitly—the State Health Plan from the mandate provided for by this 
statute.10 
Moreover, we must read the language of section 38-71-46 in accordance 
with the statute's general purpose.  See Eagle Container Co., 379 S.C. at 570, 666 
10 Although section 38-71-46 indicates that the General Assembly intended for the 
diabetes mandate to apply to the State Health Plan, we do not conclude that the 
canon of construction "expression unius est exclusion alterius" applies here, or that 
the State Health Plan is governed by every general insurance statute where the 
General Assembly failed to expressly exclude the State Health Plan.   
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S.E.2d at 896. South Carolina is cursed by diabetes.  According to the South 
Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control's most recently 
published statistics, South Carolina ranks seventh highest in the nation for the 
percentage of its adult population with diabetes.  S.C Dep't of Health & Envtl. 
Control, Fact Sheet: Diabetes in South Carolina, SCDHEC.gov, 1 (Nov. 1, 2013), 
available at http://www.scdhec.gov/administration/library/ML-025328.pdf. 
Diabetes particularly plagues our state's African-American population, as one in 
seven African-Americans in South Carolina suffers from diabetes.  Id.
Uncontrolled diabetes can lead to serious complications, and is the seventh leading 
cause of death in South Carolina.  Id.  However, when diabetes is properly 
managed, people suffering from the disease often live long, healthy lives.  Id. at 2.  
With these statistics in mind, we find that the General Assembly sought to alleviate 
and prevent diabetes' potentially devastating effects on those South Carolinians 
suffering from the disease by mandating coverage for the equipment, supplies, 
medication, and education for the treatment of diabetes.   
Thus, given the prevalence of diabetes in South Carolina, coupled with the 
General Assembly's purpose behind enacting section 38-71-46, we find it 
inconceivable that the General Assembly intended to exclude South Carolinians 
insured by the State Health Plan from receiving the benefits of section 38-71-46's 
mandate. This result is especially unlikely in a case such as this one, where if the 
policy is interpreted as Respondents argue, it would cover an insulin pump, but not 
the education on how to use it.  Therefore, we believe our reading comports with 
the general purpose and the plain language of section 38-71-46.    
Assuming arguendo that section 38-71-840(14) is ambiguous, and that it is 
necessary to look beyond the plain language of that section, we still do not find 
that the General Assembly intended to exclude the State Health Plan from section 
38-71-46's mandate.  According to the ALC, the General Assembly developed a 
"method" for identifying whether a general insurance statute governs the State 
Health Plan by choosing whether or not to expressly reference the State Health 
Plan in each general insurance statute.  However, the sections that include an 
express reference to the State Health Plan were enacted years after section 38-71-
46, which was enacted in 1999. See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 38-71-243, -280, -785 
(Supp. 2013).11  Because these provisions should be viewed in light of when they 
11 Section 38-71-280 was enacted in 2007.  Act No. 65, 2007 S.C. Acts 284, 284.   
Sections 38-71-243 and 38-71-785 were both enacted in 2010.  Act. No. 143, 2010 
S.C. Acts 1162, 1162–63; Act No. 217, 2010 S.C. Acts 1545, 1549–50.
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were enacted, they do not support the ALC's conclusion that the General Assembly 
did not intend for section 38-71-46's mandate to apply to the State Health Plan. 
Likewise, the distinction between Title 1 and Title 38 of the South Carolina 
Code cannot be relied upon as evidence that the General Assembly intended to 
exclude the State Health Plan from section 38-71-46's mandate. Title 1, Chapter 
11, of the South Carolina Code defines the State Health Plan and sets forth 
procedures for its administration.  See S.C. Code Ann. §§ 1-11-10 to -780 (2002 & 
Supp. 2013). We find that the General Assembly's decision to place the definitions 
and procedures in Title 1, instead of in Title 38, does not indicate its intent to 
exclude the State Health Plan from any insurance mandate included in Title 38 
where it is not otherwise mentioned. Therefore, the General Assembly's decision 
to define the State Health Plan in Title 1 provides no indication of legislative intent 
here. 
Finally, we find that the ALC erred in distinguishing self-insured plans for 
purposes of state insurance mandates and in finding that section 38-71-46 has no 
application to the State Health Plan because it is self-funded.  In support of this 
proposition, the ALC cites FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990). However, 
in Holliday, the United States Supreme Court's inquiry was limited to health plans 
under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), as the 
Court determined whether ERISA preempted the application of a Pennsylvania 
statute to a self-funded health care plan.  Id. at 54. Holliday has no application to 
this case. We do not distinguish self-insurers for purposes of insurance mandates, 
and as discussed, supra, section 38-71-46's mandate applies to the State Health 
Plan. 
Therefore, we hold, as a matter of law, that section 38-71-46 applies to the 
State Health Plan.    
II. Failure to Address Class Action Relief
The ALC's disposition of this case permitted it to decline to address the issue 
of whether class action relief is available in this case.  See Futch v. McAllister 
Towing of Georgetown, Inc. 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 (1999) 
(holding that a court need not address remaining issues when resolution of a prior 
issue is dispositive).   Based on our holding that section 38-71-46 applies to the 
State Health Plan, the availability of class action relief in this case is an issue that 
must be addressed, and a remand to the ALC to consider the class action issue 
would normally be appropriate.  However, because this issue can be resolved as a 
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matter of law, we choose to address this issue. 
Appellant argues that he is entitled to pursue this case as a class action 
before the ALC based on Rule 23 of the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure 
(SCRCP). He asserts that the SCRCP is applicable pursuant to Rule 68 of the 
South Carolina Rules of Procedure for the Administrative Law Court (SCRPALC).  
We disagree. 
While this case was pending before the ALC, Rule 68, SCRPALC, and the 
notes to that rule, stated: 
Applicability of South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and 
South Carolina Appellate Court Rules. The South Carolina Rules of 
Civil Procedure and the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules may, in 
the discretion of the presiding administrative law judge, be applied in 
proceedings before the Court to resolve questions not addressed by 
these rules. 
2009 Revised Notes 
The South Carolina Appellate Court Rules may, in the discretion of 
the presiding administrative law judge, be applied in appellate 
proceedings before the Court to resolve questions which are not 
addressed by the Court’s 
appellate rules. 
Based on the language of the rule and the accompanying notes, we find that 
the intent of the ALC in promulgating Rule 68 was to allow the SCRCP to be used 
to fill in the gaps in the SCRPALC in a contested case before the ALC, and to 
allow the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules to be used to fill in the gaps in the 
SCRPALC in an appeal before the ALC.    
The present case was an appeal before the ALC.  Therefore, the SCRCP, 
including Rule 23 relating to class actions, is simply inapplicable.  Neither the 
SCRPALC nor the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules provide for a class action 
to be commenced during an appeal.  Therefore, Appellant's request for a class 
action proceeding before the ALC fails as a matter of law. 
Further, since the filing of the appeal with this Court, the ALC has amended 
Rule 68, SCRPALC, and its notes to read: 
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Applicability of South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure and 
South Carolina Appellate Court Rules. The South Carolina Rules of 
Civil Procedure and the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules, in 
contested cases and appeals respectively, may, in the discretion of the 
presiding administrative law judge, be applied to resolve questions not 
addressed by these rules. 
2014 Revised Notes 
In contested cases only, the South Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure 
may, in the discretion of the presiding administrative law judge, be 
applied to resolve questions not addressed by these Rules.  
Furthermore, the South Carolina Appellate Court Rules may be
applied in like manner in appellate proceedings only.   
The revised rule contains even a more direct statement that the SCRCP is 
inapplicable to appeals before the ALC.  Since this amendment relates to 
procedure, it is fully applicable to any further proceedings before the ALC, 
including any remand by this Court. Fairchild v. S.C.Dept. of Transp., 398 S.C. 
90, 727 S.E.2d 407 (same rules of construction are used to interpret rules as are 
used to interpret statutes); State v. Davis, 309 S.C. 326, 422 S.E.2d 133 (1992), 
overruled on other grounds by Brightman v. State, 336 S.C. 348, 520 S.E.2d 614 
(1999) ("When a statute is procedural, it ordinarily will be accorded a retroactive 
application in the sense that it will be applied to pending actions and 
proceedings.").12 
12 Appellant also argues that the EIP Appeals Committee erred in failing to
consider his request for class certification. We find that this issue is not preserved 
for appellate review. 
In the document seeking review from the EIP Appeals Committee, Appellant 
attached and incorporated the allegations of the complaint and other documents 
filed in a circuit court civil action that he had brought.  While these documents 
were sufficient to put the EIP Appeals Committee on notice that Appellant was 
seeking class certification in the circuit court action, nothing in these documents 
was sufficient to place the EIP Appeals Committee on notice that Appellant was 
seeking to pursue a class action in the proceeding before the Committee.  
Therefore, any issue regarding the denial of a class action before the EIP Appeals 
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CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the ALC's decision that section 38-71-
46 of the South Carolina Code does not apply to this matter.  The EIP shall 
promptly determine and pay the benefits that are due for Appellant's daughter 
under the State Health Plan. 
REVERSED. 
BEATTY, KITTREDGE and HEARN, JJ., concur.  PLEICONES, J., 
dissenting in a separate opinion. 
Committee is not preserved for appellate review.  Carson v. S.C. Dept. of Natural
Res., 371 S.C. 114, 638 S.E.2d 45 (2002) (issue not raised to agency is not 
preserved for appellate review); Hubbard v. Rowe, 192 S.C. 12, 5 S.E.2d 187 
(1939) (issues presented for appellate review must have been fairly and properly 
raised to the lower court).
Further, in the statement of the issues on appeal before the ALC, the sole 
issue relating to class action stated:  "Does the ALC have the authority to certify a 
class action pursuant [SCRPALC] Rule 68 and SCRCP 23?"  This issue did not 
raise any allegation of error by the EIP Appeals Committee. Therefore, any 
allegation of error on the part of the EIP Appeals Committee is not before this 
Court because it was not properly raised to the ALC.  Linda Mc Co. Inc. v. Shore, 
390 S.C. 543, 703 S.E.2d 499 (2010);  Rule 37(B)(1), SCRPALC (The brief of a 
party shall contain "[a] statement of each of the issues presented for review.  The 
statement shall be concise and direct as to each issue and may be stated in question 
form.  Broad general statements may be disregarded by the Court.  Ordinarily, no 
point will be considered that is not set forth in the statement of issues on appeal."). 
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JUSTICE PLEICONES: I respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority that 
S.C. Code Ann. § 38-71-46 (2002) applies to the State Health Plan (Plan).  
This case is controlled by section 38-71-46(D), which defines what "health 
insurance polic[ies]" are covered under the diabetes education mandate in section 
38-71-46(A).13 Since the Plan is a group health plan, section 38-71-46(D) requires 
the use of S.C. Code Ann. § 38-71-840(14) (2002) to determine whether the Plan 
provides "health insurance coverage," so as to be a "health insurance policy" 
covered by this diabetes education mandate. In my opinion, it does not.  
Section 38-71-840(14) provides: 
"Health insurance coverage" means benefits consisting of medical 
care provided directly, through insurance or reimbursement, or 
otherwise and including items and services paid for as medical care 
under any hospital or medical service policy or certificate, hospital or 
medical service plan contract, or health maintenance organization 
contract offered by a health insurance issuer….  
Ultimately, whether the Plan qualifies as "health insurance coverage" depends 
onwhat the phrase "offered by a health insurance issuer" modifies in S.C. Code 
Ann. § 38-71-840(14) (2002). 
I read section 38-71-840(14) differently than does the majority. I read "benefits 
consisting of medical care provided directly, through insurance or reimbursement, 
or otherwise and including items and services paid for as medical care" as 
describing what types of provided benefits qualify as "health insurance coverage." 
I read the next section "under any hospital or medical service policy or certificate, 
hospital or medical service plan contract, or health maintenance organization 
contract offered by a health insurance issuer" as describing what types of insuring 
agreements offer "health insurance coverage." The term "offered by health 
insurance issuer" modifies the three types of insurance agreements in the statute, 
13 While section 38-71-46(A) states that "every health maintenance organization, 
individual and group health insurance policy" is covered under this mandate, 
section 38-71-46(D) requires that these policies provide "health insurance 
coverage" before this mandate is to apply. See § 38-71-46(D) ("For purposes of 
this section: “Health insurance policy” means a health benefit plan, contract, or 
evidence of coverage providing health insurance coverage as defined in Section 
38-71-670(6) and Section 38-71-840(14)."). 
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that is, (1) a hospital or medical service policy or certificate, (2) a hospital or 
medical service plan contract, or (3) a health maintenance organization contract. 
Accordingly, to qualify as "health insurance coverage" the policy, certificate, or 
contract must be issued by a "health insurance issuer." 
 The next step is to determine whether the EIP is a "health insurance issuer." This 
term is defined in S.C. Code Ann. § 38-71-840(16) (2002):
“Health insurance issuer” or “issuer” means any entity that provides 
health insurance coverage in this State. For purposes of this section, 
“issuer” includes an insurance company, a health maintenance 
organization, and any other entity providing health insurance coverage 
which is licensed to engage in the business of insurance in this State 
and which is subject to state insurance regulation.
I agree with the ALC's conclusion that the EIP is not a "health insurance issuer" 
because the EIP is not licensed to engage in the business of insurance in this State 
and not subject to State insurance regulation. See S.C. Code Ann. § 1-11-780 
(Supp. 2013) ("[t]he State Employee Insurance Program. . . is not under the 
jurisdiction of the Department of Insurance"). Since the EIP is not a "health 
insurance issuer" under section 38-71-840(16), the Plan does not provide "health 
insurance coverage" as defined in section 38-71-840(14). Further, since section 38-
71-46 only mandates diabetes education coverage for a "health insurance policy" 
that provides "health insurance coverage" as defined by section 38-71-840(14), I 
agree with the ALC that Appellant's claim was properly denied.  
Assuming, however, that we must reach the issue of intent, I would reach the same 
result.14 The General Assembly has chosen to separate the Plan from general 
insurance regulation by placing the Plan's governing statutes in Title 1, Chapter 11 
of the S.C. Code, rather than in Title 38, Chapter 71 (General Insurance Statutes).15 
Since the General Assembly separated the Plan from the General Insurance 
14 If the language of a statute gives rise to doubt or uncertainty as to legislative 
intent, the construing court may search for that intent beyond the borders of the 
statute itself. Wade v. Berkeley County, 348 S.C. 224, 229, 559 S.E.2d 586, 588 
(2002).
15 I reiterate that the General Assembly has specified that EIP, and correspondingly 
the Plan, is not subject to regulation by the South Carolina Department of 
Insurance. S.C. Code Ann. § 1-11-780 (Supp. 2013).  
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 Statutes, it has included an express reference to the Plan in the General Insurance 
Statutes when those statutes are to apply to the Plan. See S.C. Code Ann. § 38-71-
785(B) (Supp. 2013) ("This section applies. . .including the state health plan. . ."); 
S.C. Code Ann. § 38-71-243(B) (Supp. 2013) ("This section applies. . .including 
the state health plan. . ."). Furthermore, in the context of coverage mandates, the 
General Assembly has made a direct reference to the Plan when it intends for a 
mandate found in the General Insurance Statutes to apply to the Plan. See S.C. 
Code Ann. § 38-71-280 (Supp. 2013) (mandating coverage for autism spectrum 
disorder, "[i]t includes the State Health Plan. . . 'State Health Plan' means the 
employee and retirees insurance program provided for in Article 5, Chapter 11, 
Title 1").  The diabetes education mandate, however, contains no reference to the 
Plan either in the text or the enacting legislation. Accordingly, I find that the 
General Assembly did not intend for the diabetes education mandate in section 38-
71-46 to apply to the Plan. 
I also disagree with the majority that the separate treatment of the Plan does not 
evidence intent for the Plan to be treated differently. Further, I disagree with the 
majority's contention that because sections 38-71-243, 38-71-280, and 38-71-785 
were enacted after section 38-71-46, they cannot support the proposition that when 
the General Assembly intends for a General Insurance Statute to apply to the Plan, 
it expressly references the Plan. If a General Insurance Statute applies to the Plan 
even when the Plan is not mentioned, then there would have been no reason to 
include the express reference to the Plan in any General Insurance Statute. In 
construing a statute, we are to assume the General Assembly was aware of past 
statutes, and we are to give effect to all the words in a statute. Whitner v. State, 328 
S.C. 1, 6, 492 S.E.2d 777, 779 (1997) (noting the basic presumption that the 
legislature has knowledge of previous legislation); Matter of Decker, 322 S.C. 215, 
219, 471 S.E.2d 462, 463 (1995) (citing 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 346) (noting that 
courts are to give effect to all words in a statute). The majority's reading renders 
the references in the later statutes superfluous and leads to the absurd result that all 
General Insurance Statutes apply to the Plan unless the Plan is expressly excluded.  
Finally, while I am not unsympathetic to the thousands of South Carolinians who 
suffer from the devastating effects of diabetes, the existence of this health scourge, 
while tragic, is, in my opinion, of no assistance in our task of statutory 
construction. Therefore, I disagree with the majority's reliance on the prevalence of 
a disease in determining whether a coverage mandate found in a General Insurance 
Statute applies to the Plan. 
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I would affirm the ALC's holding that section 38-71-46 does not apply to the Plan 
and uphold the denial of Appellant's claim. 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina
In the Matter of Fred W. Auman, III, Respondent.
Appellate Case Nos. 2015-000353 and -000354 
ORDER 
This order is substituted for all orders issued in this matter on February 25, 2015, 
which are hereby vacated. 
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel asks this Court to issue an order placing 
respondent on interim suspension pursuant to Rule 17, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR, 
or in the alternative, transferring respondent to incapacity inactive status pursuant 
to Rule 28, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR.  The petition also seeks appointment of the 
Receiver or an attorney pursuant to Rule 31, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR, to protect 
the interests of respondent's clients.   
IT IS ORDERED that respondent's license to practice law in this state is suspended 
and respondent is transferred to incapacity inactive status until further order of this 
Court. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Peyre Thomas Lumpkin, Esquire, Receiver, is 
hereby appointed to protect the interests of respondent's clients pursuant to Rule 
31, RLDE. 
Mr. Lumpkin shall assume responsibility for respondent's client files, trust 
account(s), escrow account(s), operating account(s), and any other law office 
accounts respondent may maintain, and take action as required by Rule 31, RLDE, 
to protect the interests of respondent's clients.  Mr. Lumpkin may make 
disbursements from respondent's trust account(s), escrow account(s), operating 
account(s), and any other law office accounts respondent may maintain that are 
necessary to effectuate this appointment. 
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This Order, when served on any bank or other financial institution maintaining 
trust, escrow and/or operating account(s) of respondent, shall serve as an injunction 
to prevent respondent from making withdrawals from the account(s) and shall 
further serve as notice to the bank or other financial institution that the Receiver, 
Peyre Thomas Lumpkin, Esquire, has been duly appointed by this Court.
Finally, this Order, when served on any office of the United States Postal Service, 
shall serve as notice that the Receiver, Peyre Thomas Lumpkin, Esquire, has been 
duly appointed by this Court and has the authority to receive respondent's mail and 
the authority to direct that respondent's mail be delivered to Mr. Lumpkin's office. 
Mr. Lumpkin's appointment shall be for a period of no longer than nine months 
unless an extension of the period of appointment is requested. 
s/ Jean H. Toal C.J. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
February 26, 2015 
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The Supreme Court of South Carolina
In the Matter of Stephen Edward Carter, Respondent. 
Appellate Case Nos. 2015-000403 and -000404 
ORDER 
The Office of Disciplinary Counsel petitions this Court to place respondent on 
interim suspension pursuant to Rule 17(b), RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR, and/or 
transfer respondent to incapacity inactive status pursuant to Rule 28, RLDE, Rule 
413, SCACR. The petition also seeks appointment of the Receiver to protect the 
interests of respondent's clients pursuant to Rule 31, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR.  
Respondent consents to the petition.
IT IS ORDERED that respondent's license to practice law in this state is suspended 
until further order of this Court. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Peyre Thomas Lumpkin, Esquire, Receiver, is 
hereby appointed to assume responsibility for respondent's client files, trust 
account(s), escrow account(s), operating account(s), and any other law office 
accounts respondent may maintain.  Mr. Lumpkin shall take action as required by 
Rule 31, RLDE, Rule 413, SCACR, to protect the interests of respondent's clients.  
Mr. Lumpkin may make disbursements from respondent's trust account(s), escrow 
account(s), operating account(s), and any other law office accounts respondent 
may maintain that are necessary to effectuate this appointment. 
This Order, when served on any bank or other financial institution maintaining 
trust, escrow and/or operating account(s) of respondent, shall serve as an injunction 
to prevent respondent from making withdrawals from the account(s) and shall 
further serve as notice to the bank or other financial institution that the Receiver, 
Peyre Thomas Lumpkin, Esquire, has been duly appointed by this Court.
40 

  
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finally, this Order, when served on any office of the United States Postal Service, 
shall serve as notice that the Receiver, Peyre Thomas Lumpkin, Esquire, has been 
duly appointed by this Court and has the authority to receive respondent's mail and 
the authority to direct that respondent's mail be delivered to Mr. Lumpkin's office. 
Mr. Lumpkin's appointment shall be for a period of no longer than nine months 
unless an extension of the period of appointment is requested. 
s/ Jean H. Toal C.J. 
Columbia, South Carolina 
March 3, 2015 
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THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA 

In The Court of Appeals 

South Carolina Public Interest Foundation and Edward 
D. Sloan, individually, and on behalf of all others 
similarly situated, Appellants, 
v. 
South Carolina Department of Transportation and John 
V. Walsh, Deputy Secretary of Transportation for 
Engineering, Respondents. 
Appellate Case No. 2012-213599 
Appeal From Richland County 
L. Casey Manning, Circuit Court Judge 
Opinion No. 5299 

Heard December 9, 2014 – Filed March 4, 2015 

AFFIRMED 
James G. Carpenter and Jennifer J. Miller, both of 
Carpenter Law Firm, of Greenville, for Appellants. 
Beacham O. Brooker, Jr., of Columbia, for Respondents. 
SHORT, J.:  South Carolina Public Interest Foundation and Edward D. Sloan, Jr., 
individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated (collectively, 
Appellants), filed this declaratory judgment action against South Carolina 
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Department of Transportation (SCDOT), and John V. Walsh, Deputy Secretary of 
Transportation for Engineering at SCDOT.  Appellants appeal, arguing the trial 
court erred in (1) failing to grant Appellants public importance standing, (2) failing 
to acknowledge taxpayer standing, (3) failing to apply exceptions to mootness, (4) 
ruling SCDOT was legitimately assisting a municipality, and (5) failing to find 
SCDOT used public funds for private purposes. We affirm. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Woodside Plantation (Woodside) is a gated housing development in the City of 
Aiken. As of July 2011, Woodside had approximately four thousand residents and 
was expected to grow to eight thousand residents.  The City of Aiken refused to 
acquire the roads in Woodside unless the gates were removed.   
Throughout 2010 and 2011, Woodside Plantation Property Owners' Association, 
Inc. and the City of Aiken1 attempted to enlist SCDOT's assistance in inspecting 
three wooden bridges located in Woodside. Walsh emailed the Chief Engineer for 
Operations of SCDOT to discuss the issue, stating, "I need to get some bridges 
reviewed for safety/loading purposes."  On August, 18, 2001, the Chief Engineer 
requested an inspection of the bridges in Woodside.  A three-man SCDOT crew 
inspected the bridges on August 23, 2011.  By affidavit, Walsh testified the 
estimated cost to SCDOT for the inspection was $1,400.  Walsh also testified that 
in ten years, only one other private bridge had been inspected at the request of a 
local government–on Fripp Island in 2006.  Walsh concluded the bridges were in 
good condition with minor problems.  After the inspection, an employee reported 
improper use of SCDOT employees to SCDOT's Office of the Chief Internal 
Auditor (OCIA). OCIA investigated and determined "SCDOT has no obligation to
inspect bridges on private property."  OCIA notified the Secretary of SCDOT, 
Robert St. Onge, of its interpretation.  
Appellants filed this declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that 
SCDOT actions in inspecting the privately owned bridges in Woodside at the 
request of the City of Aiken violated Article X, sections 5 and 11 of the South 
Carolina Constitution.  Appellants also sought costs and attorneys' fees under 
section 15-77-300 of the South Carolina Code.  After receipt of cross-motions for 
1 A city councilman who lived in Woodside Plantation initiated the inquiries. 
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summary judgment and a hearing, the circuit court granted SCDOT's motion for 
summary judgment and dismissed the complaint.  This appeal followed. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This is an action in equity. See Sloan v. Greenville Cnty., 356 S.C. 531, 544, 590 
S.E.2d 338, 345-46 (Ct. App. 2003) (Sloan 2003) (finding a declaratory judgment 
action brought by a taxpayer citizen requesting declaratory relief is an action in 
equity). In an appeal from an action in equity tried by a judge, an appellate court 
may find facts in accordance with its own view of the preponderance of the 
evidence. Townes Assocs., Ltd. v. City of Greenville, 266 S.C. 81, 86, 221 S.E.2d 
773, 775-76 (1976). 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Public Importance Standing 
Appellants argue the circuit court erred in failing to grant them standing based on 
public importance.  We disagree. 
"A plaintiff must have standing to institute an action.  To have standing, one must 
have a personal stake in the subject matter of the lawsuit."  Sloan 2003, 356 S.C. at 
547, 590 S.E.2d at 347 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).  "Standing 
may be acquired: (1) by statute; (2) through the rubric of 'constitutional standing'; 
or (3) under the 'public importance' exception."  ATC S., Inc. v. Charleston Cnty., 
380 S.C. 191, 195, 669 S.E.2d 337, 339 (2008).  "The key to the public importance 
analysis is whether a resolution is needed for future guidance.  It is this concept of 
'future guidance' that gives meaning to an issue which transcends a purely private 
matter and rises to the level of public importance."  Id. at 199, 669 S.E.2d at 341. 
"For a court to relax general standing rules, the matter of importance must, in the 
context of the case, be inextricably connected to the public need for court 
resolution for future guidance." Id.
In this case, we find Appellants do not have standing based on public importance.  
SCDOT has conducted its own audit and concluded its own actions were improper.  
Thus, there is no "future guidance" to be provided by this court.   
II. Taxpayer Standing 
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Appellants next argue the circuit court erred in failing to grant them taxpayer 
standing. We disagree. 
"A taxpayer's standing to challenge unauthorized or illegal governmental acts has 
been repeatedly recognized in South Carolina." Sloan v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville 
Cnty., 342 S.C. 515, 520, 537 S.E.2d 299, 301 (Ct. App. 2000) (Sloan 2000). 
"[A] court may confer standing upon a party when an issue is of such public 
importance as to require its resolution for future guidance."  Baird v. Charleston 
Cnty., 333 S.C. 519, 531, 511 S.E.2d 69, 75 (1999).  "The general rule is that a 
taxpayer may not maintain a suit to enjoin the action of State officers when he has
no special interest and his only standing is the exceedingly small interest of a 
general taxpayer." Crews v. Beattie, 197 S.C. 32, 49, 14 S.E.2d 351, 357-58 
(1941). "The mere fact that the issue is one of public importance does not confer 
upon any citizen or taxpayer the right to invoke per se a judicial determination of 
the issue." Sloan 2003, 356 S.C. at 549, 590 S.E.2d at 347 (quoting Crews, 197 
S.C. at 49, 14 S.E.2d at 357-58). "For a plaintiff to have taxpayer standing, the 
party must demonstrate some overriding public purpose or concern to confer 
standing to sue on behalf of her fellow taxpayers."  Id.; see also Baird, 333 S.C. at 
531, 511 S.E.2d at 75 (stating standing may be conferred upon a party when an 
issue is of such public importance as to require its resolution for future guidance). 
For the same reasons we find Appellants do not meet the public importance basis 
for standing, we find they do not have taxpayer standing.  In Sloan 2000, 342 S.C. 
at 522, 537 S.E.2d at 303, this court found a taxpayer had standing to challenge 
contracts entered into by the school district without following the prescribed 
competitive sealed bidding procedure.  In Sloan 2003, 356 S.C. at 551, 590 S.E.2d 
at 349, this court again found a taxpayer had standing to challenge contracts 
entered into by the county without following the procurement procedures set out in 
the county code. The public interest involved was the prevention of the unlawful 
expenditure of money raised by taxation.  Id. at 550, 590 S.E.2d at 348. 
Unlike the Sloan 2000 and Sloan 2003 cases, we find Appellants do not have 
taxpayer standing here because there is not a public interest involved in preventing 
the unlawful expenditure of inspecting private bridges when SCDOT has already 
determined its own policy prohibits the action.  See Sloan v. Greenville Cnty., 361 
S.C. 568, 571-72, 606 S.E.2d 464, 466 (2004) (Sloan 2004) (finding "no 
imperative or manifest urgency in obtaining an advisory opinion on the application 
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of an obsolete procurement ordinance" in a challenge to procurement methods 
when two prior court of appeals opinions provided judicial guidance to Greenville 
County regarding its written determinations under a procurement ordinance and 
when the county ordinance had been amended to address the concerns). 
III. Mootness 
Appellants also maintain the circuit court erred in failing to apply several 
exceptions to the mootness doctrine.  We disagree. 
Before any action can be maintained, a justiciable controversy must be present.  
Byrd v. Irmo High Sch., 321 S.C. 426, 430, 468 S.E.2d 861, 864 (1996).  "A 
justiciable controversy is a real and substantial controversy appropriate for judicial 
determination, as opposed to a dispute or difference of a contingent, hypothetical 
or abstract character." Sloan 2003, 356 S.C. at 546, 590 S.E.2d at 346. The court 
does not concern itself with moot or speculative questions.  Sloan v. Dep't of 
Transp., 379 S.C. 160, 167, 666 S.E.2d 236, 240 (2008) (Ladson Road). "A case 
becomes moot when judgment, if rendered, will have no practical legal effect upon 
the existing controversy."  Sloan v. Greenville Cnty., 380 S.C. 528, 535, 670 
S.E.2d 663, 667 (Ct. App. 2009) (Sloan 2009). "Mootness also arises when some 
event occurs making it impossible for the reviewing court to grant effectual relief."  
Id.  There are three exceptions to mootness.  Id. at 535, 670 S.E.2d at 667. 
First, if the issue raised is capable of repetition but 
generally will evade review, the appellate court can take 
jurisdiction. Second, an appellate court may decide 
questions of imperative and manifest urgency to establish 
a rule for future conduct in matters of important public 
interest. Application of the public interest exception 
requires the question at issue to be (1) of public 
importance, and (2) of imperative and manifest urgency.  
Third, if a decision by the trial court may affect future 
events, or have collateral consequences for the parties, an 
appeal from that decision is not moot, even though the 
appellate court cannot give effective relief in the present 
case. The utilization of an exception under the mootness 
doctrine is flexible and discretionary pursuant to South 
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Carolina jurisprudence, not a mechanical rule that is 
automatically invoked. 
Id.
Relying on Sloan v. Department of Transportation, 365 S.C. 299, 618 S.E.2d 876 
(2005) (Ravenel Bridge), Appellants argue they meet the first exception to 
mootness because this matter is capable of repetition, yet evading review.  We 
disagree. 
In Ravenel Bridge, Sloan alleged SCDOT violated statutory bidding requirements 
for three construction projects. Id. at 302, 618 S.E.2d at 877-78. Our supreme 
court found the issue was not moot despite completion of the construction projects 
because the issue was capable of repetition yet usually evading review.  Id. at 303, 
618 S.E.2d at 878. Unlike the issue in Ravenel Bridge, we find the issue here is 
not capable of repetition yet evading review because SCDOT has independently 
determined its policy does not permit the inspection of private bridges.  
Accordingly, we find Appellants have failed to meet the first exception of 
mootness.   
Appellants next argue they meet the second exception to mootness because the 
matter is of great public importance and of manifest urgency.  We again find the 
matter does not support public importance standing and is not of manifest urgency 
because SCDOT has determined its own policy does not permit the action.  See
Sloan 2004, 361 S.C. at 571-72, 606 S.E.2d at 466 (reinstating the circuit court's 
dismissal of a challenge to procurement methods as moot based in part on the 
county's amendment to its ordinance).   
Finally, Appellants argue they meet the third exception to mootness because the 
matter may "affect future events or have collateral consequences."  Relying on 
Ladson Road, 379 S.C. at 160, 666 S.E.2d at 236, Appellants maintain this case 
will affect SCDOT and other State agencies in deciding questions involving the 
use of public funds for private purposes. We disagree. 
In Ladson Road, Sloan filed a declaratory judgment action challenging SCDOT's 
decision to authorize an emergency procurement on a construction project in 
Charleston County. Id. at 166, 666 S.E.2d at 239. Our supreme court found the 
issue was not moot because "there [was] no case law specifically addressing the 
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DOT's authorization of an emergency procurement . . . and . . . this [was] a matter 
of public importance which could occur at any time . . . ."  Id. at 169, 666 S.E.2d at 
240. However, in the present case, SCDOT has determined the inspection of 
private bridges is against its own policy.  Thus, we find the matter will neither 
"affect future events [n]or have collateral consequences."   
IV. Remaining Issues 
Finally, Appellants argue the circuit court erred in finding SCDOT was 
legitimately assisting a municipality and in failing to find SCDOT violated Article 
X, sections 5 and 11 of the South Carolina Constitution.  Based on our resolution 
of the issues of standing and mootness, we need not reach this issue.  See Futch v. 
McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 591, 598 
(1999) (holding an appellate court need not address remaining issues when 
resolution of another issue disposes of the appeal). 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the order on appeal is 
AFFIRMED. 
HUFF and KONDUROS, JJ., concur. 
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KONDUROS, J.: In this shareholder dispute case, Joseph E. Mason, Jr. (Son) 
appeals the special referee's decision granting judgment on his causes of action 
including breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, wrongful termination, and 
civil conspiracy in favor of Catherine L. Mason (Mother), Joseph E. Mason, Sr. 
(Father), Kathy St. Blanchard (Daughter) (collectively, the Masons), Mason 
Holding Company, Inc. (the Company), and Irwin Levine (Accountant) 
(collectively, Respondents). He also asserts the special referee erred in not 
ordering the repurchase of his shares of the Company.  He further contends the 
special referee erred in finding for the Masons and the Company on their 
counterclaims.  We affirm. 
FACTS/PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The Company operates five tire and auto service stores in Horry and Georgetown 
Counties. It is a statutory close corporation without a board of directors.  For many 
years, Father had operated eight retail stores for Goodyear Tire & Rubber 
Company and was a partner in a truck tire center in Miami, Florida, where he and 
Mother resided. In 1984, Father decided to start a tire and auto service business in 
the greater Myrtle Beach area.  Son and Daughter wanted to be involved, and each 
contributed $10,000 for a ten percent interest in return.  Son graduated from the 
University of Alabama with a degree in business administration and started 
working for Ryder Truck Rental in Florida in 1983.  After the location was 
acquired for the first store, Son moved to Surfside Beach to open the first store and 
be the store manager. Daughter and her husband, Oswald St. Blanchard (Ozzie), 
also moved to the area to work at the store.  Daughter did bookkeeping and sales.  
Mother and Father moved to the area in 1989 to work on expanding the business 
into commercial accounts. Around 1989, Accountant started working for the 
Company as its accountant. He had previously worked for Mother as an
accountant in Florida.  Accountant was not a certified public accountant, a CPA, 
but was a PA, a public accountant. He lived in Florida and did not have a license 
to practice accountancy in South Carolina. He had prepared the Company's tax 
returns since 1989 and also served as family members' personal accountant.
In 1989, the family opened a store in North Myrtle Beach.  In 1995, they opened a 
store in Pawleys Island. In 1998, the Company was formed and ownership of the 
individual stores was transferred to the Company.  At that time, Father owned 520 
shares, Mother owned 160, Son owned 160, Daughter owned 90, and Ozzie owned 
70. In 1999, the Company opened an additional store in Myrtle Beach.  The 
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buildings and land where the Company's stores were located were owned by 
separate entities owned by members of the Company.  By 2001, Son was president 
of the Company.   
On December 18, 2004, Ozzie was severely injured in a motorcycle accident and 
as a result became a quadriplegic. The accident occurred on a Saturday while 
Ozzie was riding in a Toys for Tots ride. Ozzie was wearing his uniform and had 
represented the Company in this capacity before. Ozzie had appeared in 
commercials for the Company and was "the face" of the Company. Son believed 
Ozzie was not entitled to workers' compensation because he was not at work when 
the accident occurred and his claim would increase the Company's insurance 
premiums. The matter was litigated, and the single commissioner of the Workers'
Compensation Commission determined Ozzie was acting within the course and 
scope of his employment when the accident occurred and found the claim 
compensable. The Appellate Panel reversed the single commissioner in a two to 
one decision. The matter was appealed to the circuit court, but before the circuit 
court reached a decision, the parties settled the claim.  
Son testified Father had told him they needed to make sure Ozzie got workers' 
compensation benefits for the accident.  Son believed Father was asking him to 
perjure himself and indicated he told Father he could not do that. Son felt the 
disagreement was the turning point in his relationship with the rest of the family.
Father testified he did not ask Son to lie and Son only worried about it costing the
Company a lot of money. Father believed Ozzie was working in the course and 
scope of employment.  Father indicated Ozzie was not working at one of their 
stores that day but he was working for the company by appearing at the Toys for 
Tots event. The minutes from a stockholder meeting of the Company following 
the accident as well as Father's deposition during the workers' compensation 
proceeding state Father and other employees saw Ozzie at one of the stores on the 
day of the accident while he was picking up business cards and coupons. The 
special referee found Son's testimony on this matter to be uncredible.
Mother and Father began thinking about retirement and developed a retirement 
plan. Initially, they planned for Son and Daughter to purchase Mother's and 
Father's shares.  However, the parties decided for tax purposes Mother and Father 
would incrementally give Son and Daughter shares in the Company with Son and 
Daughter each owning half the shares by December 31, 2011. Also as part of the 
retirement plan, on January 1, 2003, an LLC owned by Mother and Father, which 
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owned the property for one of the store's locations, executed a lease with the 
Company for $90,000 annually for a term of nineteen years.  The lease was only 
for the building because a prior lease agreement was in effect for the land.  
Additionally, on December 31, 2002, Mother, Father, Daughter, and Son entered 
into an employment contract lasting until December 31, 2022, to pay Mother and 
Father a total of $10,400 per year as well as benefits including health insurance, a 
gasoline credit card, and a company car.  Accountant testified they were trying to
minimize the impact on social security income and self-employment taxes.  Father 
testified the second lease was created in order to pay Father the same amount he 
had been receiving previously though salary.  In 2003, Mother and Father began 
receiving the payments from the employment contract and through their LLC 
under the lease. By 2007, in keeping with the retirement plan, Son and Daughter 
each had a 30% share of stock in the Company.  Father testified he stopped giving 
his and Mother's shares in the Company to Son when Son brought this lawsuit.  
In 2006, Son wanted to open an additional location.  He and a friend along with 
Daughter owned the store, called Mason Tire & Auto Service, through an entity 
called BCJ Tires, LLC. The Company owned the property and building and leased 
it to BCJ Tires. The Company had no ownership interest in BCJ Tires.  On August 
3, 2007, Son transferred $93,500 from the Company to BCJ Tires without Mother 
or Father's knowledge.  When Father learned about the money, he had Son and 
Daughter transfer their interests in BCJ Tires to the Company.  Accountant later 
acquired Son's friend's shares and some of the Company's shares, resulting 
Accountant owning a majority interest in BCJ Tires.  The store operates at a loss. 
An employee for the Company testified that at times, Son did not come to work 
and gave no explanation. Father testified Son had been absent from the business 
several times and no one knew where he was.  Daughter also testified Son would 
sometimes "walk off the job" but he was always allowed to return. Father 
indicated he convened an emergency shareholder meeting because of Son's 
unexplained absences. Son testified he had sometimes worked from home but 
always had been in touch with the Company and never had stopped running the 
Company.  
On August 18, 2007, Son offered to purchase all but 5% of Daughter's 25% interest 
in the Company for $625,000 or to sell 25% of his interest in the Company for 
$987,500. He testified they had numerous discussions about different options of 
shareholders being bought out because they were not getting along.  He testified he 
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offered Daughter $1 million for her shares, but she turned it down.  Son then 
requested Father buy his shares, but Father turned him down.  Son indicated Father 
told him if he was unhappy he could quit.  Daughter also offered Son $1 million 
for his shares, but according to Son, the offer later "evaporated."   
On August 31, 2007, attorney Wayne Byrd sent a letter to the Masons advising 
them he had been retained by Son to represent his interests as an officer, director, 
and minority shareholder in the Company.  On September 17, 2007, following a 
meeting with the parties, Byrd sent a letter to the Masons' attorney ordering them 
to stop paying for the members' personal expenses, reduce Daughter's salary, and 
terminate Ozzie. Byrd also sent a letter to Accountant indicating he had learned of 
"various serious financial and tax accounting irregularities which [he] ha[d] 
devised and fashioned." All of the shareholders except Son signed an agreement to 
repay the Company for personal expenses.  Son testified he refused to sign it 
because previously, all the shareholders had approved those expenses. On 
September 28, 2007, Byrd's law firm refunded the Company for the Company's 
check Son had used to pay his fee because it was representing him individually. 
However, Son then transferred to himself from the Company the amount he owed 
Byrd, $17,301.66.
On October 24, 2007, a shareholders meeting was held, and Father was elected 
president and Son was elected vice president. Son was no longer in charge of the 
financial aspects of the Company but his salary and other responsibilities remained
the same. Son continued working until July 2008.  
On December 7, 2007, the Company held a shareholders meeting to sign the 
amended tax returns. Accountant testified Son insisted the amended tax returns not 
be filed and the Masons went along with it despite their unhappiness about it.
Father testified that at the meeting Son stated that if they would not file those 
amended tax returns and instead handled it another way, he would stay with the 
Company and Father agreed. Son testified that at the meeting, the Masons were 
screaming at him and he said the Company should do whatever was necessary to 
fix the tax returns. Son testified Accountant stated the Company could fix the 
returns by doing something else with the revenue instead of amending the returns.
Son testified he knew of the amended tax returns but did not see them before he 
brought the lawsuit.
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In December 2007, Son told Father that Steve Allison offered to buy the Company 
for $3 million.  Father testified he did not consider it a serious offer because he did 
not believe Allison knew any details about the Company.  Father indicated he 
called Allison and informed him he was not interested in selling the Company at 
that time. Allison testified he was president of a company that owned car oil 
change shops and in December 2007 he was interested in buying the Company 
based on his observations of the Company over thirteen years.  Allison offered $3 
million because Son believed from prior conversations with Father he would 
accept that amount.
Sandra Adams worked as a bookkeeper for the Company.  In July 2008, Son 
determined from some discrepancies in the monthly payments for an insurance 
policy Adams was stealing from the Company and informed Father and Daughter 
he was going to fire her. Father testified he and Daughter expressed concern that 
Son not fire her right away due to the workload it would place on Daughter until 
Adams could be replaced. Son stated that he was going to do the firing 
immediately, and Father said he would support him. Son fired Adams, but Father 
decided to rehire Adams because he thought they needed to look into the matter 
further. Father indicated that when he told Son, Son said, "I'll bury you." Father 
rehired Adams and put her on probation.  He testified it was unproven whether 
Adams was stealing and she was still employed by the Company. The special 
referee found Father's testimony on the matter credible and determined Father's
"actions were consistent with the Company's best interest and the decision was a 
valid business judgment."  
On August 5, 2008, Son filed a complaint against the Masons and the Company, 
asserting causes of action for breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, civil 
conspiracy, relief pursuant to sections 33-14-300 to -330 of the South Carolina 
Code1, wrongful termination of employment-constructive discharge, and wrongful 
termination-violation of public policy.  On September 23, 2009, Son filed an 
amended complaint adding Accountant as a defendant and adding a cause of action 
against him for aiding and abetting breach of fiduciary duty.  The Masons and the 
Company filed an answer asserting affirmative defenses and counterclaims against 
Son for breach of fiduciary duty and conversion.2  The parties consented to the 
1 Under this cause of action, Son requested the court order a purchase of his shares 

in the Company at fair value.   

2 Accountant filed a separate answer. 
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case being referred to the special referee. The special referee conducted a five-day 
trial on the case.
The conversion counterclaim was based on an alleged casing3 scheme. Son 
testified he would fabricate the name of a company, write a receipt for truck tires 
from that company, and take cash out of the drawer in that amount.  He indicated 
he would later split that money with Daughter. He testified Accountant told him
this was acceptable as long as he split the money with Daughter.  Accountant 
testified he did not tell Son how to create fictitious invoices.  An employee of the 
Company testified that between 2003 and 2007 he had noticed cash missing from
the drawer and an invoice for casings but there were no casings. He testified he 
noticed Son taking money out of the cash drawer and would see the invoice audit 
at the end of the day. 
In 2003 and 2006, Son made adjustments to the records for the Company that 
increased the inventory and created a corresponding credit note payable to Son and 
Daughter. The note for 2003 was $440,000 and for 2006 it was $300,000.  Son 
and Ozzie signed the 2003 note and it was witnessed by Mother and Father.  
Daughter did not sign either note and testified she did not know about the notes 
until Son asked her in 2007 to sign two promissory notes and she refused. Son 
indicated the family all knew about the inventory adjustments and it was 
Accountant's idea to decrease the Company's tax liability.  Accountant testified he 
told Son about both the proper way to fix the inventory problem and the way he 
ultimately handled it. Accountant testified Son decided to make the 2003 
adjustment in order to decrease the Company's tax liability. Accountant testified 
that at the time, only Son and himself knew about the 2003 adjustment and 
Accountant did not know about the 2006 adjustment until after Son had made it. 
Son testified he had relied on Accountant's advice that the adjustments were proper 
and he did not know about the "severity" of the adjustments until Byrd informed 
him. Laura Durant, a CPA retained by the Masons and the Company for trial, 
testified the adjustments had no basis in reality and had a significant effect on the 
income tax returns. Son testified he signed the tax returns from 1984 until 2007, 
specifically in 2003 and 2006. Son testified he did not know the tax returns were 
fraudulent because he relied on Accountant and he did not think the Masons knew 
the returns were fraudulent until 2007. Accountant testified he did not tell the 
3 A casing is a used commercial tire that has the capability of being recapped for 
sale. 
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Masons the tax returns were fraudulent. He testified he accepted the way Son had 
handled the excess inventory and filed the tax returns because of his close 
relationship with the family.  The special referee found Accountant's testimony 
regarding making inventory adjustments and creating fictitious notes substantially 
more credible than Son's despite the fact that his filing of the tax returns was 
professionally inappropriate.
David Timothy Duncan, an accountant hired by the Company, testified he was 
involved with reviewing amended tax returns for the Company in 2007. He 
decided to not file the amended returns and returned them to Accountant. Duncan 
testified that while he was considering the amended returns, Son talked to him 
about inventory adjustments and Duncan advised him against it.  
Son testified no one fired him, told him not to come back, or cut his pay.  He found 
working at the Company intolerable and thought the other shareholders wanted 
him to quit.  He stated that although the Company did not reduce his pay or 
benefits, the Masons embarrassed him in front of other employees.   
The special referee found for Respondents on all of Son's causes of action.4  The 
special referee found "it is beyond dispute in my opinion that Son was aware of 
and actively engaged in and furthered the very practices about which his 
attorney['s] September 17, 2007 letter complains and which form the basis of some
of the claims in this action." The special referee also determined nothing in the 
record indicated the Masons deviated from the appropriate standard of conduct.
The special referee determined nothing indicated the Masons' conduct towards Son 
was oppressive or unfairly prejudicial and they had not breached their fiduciary 
duty. The referee further found because Son presented no evidence of a breach by 
the Masons, his claim for his shares to be repurchased must fail. He found, 
Son's dissatisfaction with his lack of employment by 
[the] Company, as well as with diminution of the value of 
his shares due to significant tax liability and the 
unfortunate business decision to expand the Company's 
operation . . . are matters that were principally due to and 
occasioned by the conduct and decisions of Son. 
4 The special referee issued one order for the actions regarding the Masons and the 
Company and another for the action against Accountant.   
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He noted that Son's request for his shares to be purchased was an equitable one and 
Son's unclean hands from his conduct prevented him from relying on an action for 
stockholder oppression or breach of fiduciary duty.  
The special referee found "[t]he inaccuracies in the tax returns and any damages 
that flow from these falsities would affect the corporation in its entirety, not Son 
specifically.  Therefore, Son's suit was improper in that it was not filed as a 
derivative action." The special referee also stated, "Contrary to the holding in 
Brown v. Stewart[5], Son has sued . . . Father, Mother[,] and [Daughter] under 
[sections 33-8-300 and -420 of the South Carolina Code (2006)]."  
The special referee found for the Masons and the Company on their counterclaims
for conversion regarding the casings scheme and Son's payment of his attorney's
fees and awarded them $11,716.32 and $17,301.66 respectively.  The special 
referee determined the cause of action for damages arising from the filing of false 
tax returns was not ripe for adjudication because the amount of damages was 
undetermined at the time.   
 Son filed a Rule 59(e), SCRCP, motion, requesting the special referee delete or 
clarify the portion of the order relating to the counterclaim regarding the tax 
obligations. The special referee denied the motion.  This appeal followed.   
5 Brown v. Stewart, 348 S.C. 33, 49, 557 S.E.2d 676, 684-85 (Ct. App. 2001) ("If 
misconduct by the management of a corporation has caused a particular loss to an 
individual stockholder, the liability for the mismanagement is an asset of the 
individual stockholder.  Of course, a suit based on the misconduct can be brought 
by the individual stockholder.  It becomes material, therefore, to inquire whether 
the acts of mismanagement charged to the directors affected the plaintiffs directly, 
or as their interests were submerged in the corporation whose assets were thus 
dissipated." (citation and internal quotations marks omitted)).   
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STANDARD OF REVIEW6 
"[A]n appellate court must look to the main purpose of the proceeding in order to 
determine the standard of review to exact."  Wheeler v. Estate of Green, 381 S.C. 
548, 554, 673 S.E.2d 836, 839-40 (Ct. App. 2009).  "The character of the action is 
generally ascertained from the body of the complaint, but when necessary, resort 
may also be had to the prayer for relief and any other facts and circumstances 
which throw light upon the main purpose of the action."  Sloan v. Greenville Cnty., 
380 S.C. 528, 534, 670 S.E.2d 663, 666-67 (Ct. App. 2009).  "When legal and 
equitable actions are maintained in one suit, the court is presented with a divided 
scope of review, and each action retains its own identity as legal or equitable for 
purposes of review on appeal." Wright v. Craft, 372 S.C. 1, 17, 640 S.E.2d 486, 
495 (Ct. App. 2006). "The proper analysis is to view the actions separately for the 
purpose of determining the appropriate standard of review."  Id. at 17-18, 640 
S.E.2d at 495. 
LAW/ANALYSIS 
I. Judicial Dissolution/Repurchase of Shares 
Son argues the special referee erred in denying him relief under the judicial 
dissolution provisions governing South Carolina corporations.  He asserts the 
special referee should have ordered a buyout of his shares.  We disagree. 
"Under the two[-]issue rule, whe[n] a decision is based on more than one ground, 
the appellate court will affirm unless the appellant appeals all grounds because the 
unappealed ground will become the law of the case."  Jones v. Lott, 387 S.C. 339, 
346, 692 S.E.2d 900, 903 (2010). 
6 Son urges this court to use caution in applying the standard of review because the 
orders from which this appeal is taken were prepared by Respondents.  See In re 
Luhr Bros., 157 F.3d 333, 338 (5th Cir. 1998) ("[I]n cases such as the instant one, 
where the district court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law are near-
verbatim recitals of the prevailing party's proposed findings and conclusions, with 
minimal revision, we should approach such findings with 'caution.'"). 
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It should be noted that although cases generally have 
discussed the two[-]issue rule in the context of the 
appellate treatment of general jury verdicts, the rule is 
applicable under other circumstances on appeal, 
including affirmance of orders of trial courts. For 
example, if a court directs a verdict for a defendant on 
the basis of the defenses of statute of limitations and 
contributory negligence, the order would be affirmed 
under the two[-]issue rule if the plaintiff failed to appeal 
both grounds or if one of the grounds required 
affirmance. 
Id. at 346, 692 S.E.2d at 904 (internal quotation marks omitted).  "[A]n unappealed 
ruling, right or wrong, is the law of the case." Atl. Coast Builders & Contractors, 
LLC v. Lewis, 398 S.C. 323, 329, 730 S.E.2d 282, 285 (2012). 
"A corporate dissolution is an action in equity." Jordan v. Holt, 362 S.C. 201, 205, 
608 S.E.2d 129, 131 (2005). "A shareholders derivative action, as well as an 
action for stockholder oppression, is one in equity."  Ballard v. Roberson, 399 S.C. 
588, 593, 733 S.E.2d 107, 109 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted).  "In 
actions in equity referred to a special referee with finality, the appellate court may 
view the evidence to determine the facts in accordance with its own view of the 
preponderance of the evidence, though it is not required to disregard the findings 
of the special referee." Florence Cnty. Sch. Dist. # 2 v. Interkal, Inc., 348 S.C. 
446, 450, 559 S.E.2d 866, 868 (Ct. App. 2002); see also First Union Nat'l Bank of 
S.C. v. Soden, 333 S.C. 554, 567, 511 S.E.2d 372, 379 (Ct. App. 1998) ("[W]e are 
not required to disregard the findings of the trial judge who saw and heard the 
witnesses and was in a better position to judge their credibility."). 
Sections 33-18-400 to -430 of the South Carolina Code (2006) apply to close 
corporations. 
(a) Subject to satisfying the conditions of subsections (c) 
and (d), a shareholder of a statutory close corporation 
may petition the circuit court for any of the relief 
described in [s]ection 33-18-410, 33-18-420, or 33-18-
430 if: 
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(1) the directors or those in control of the corporation 
have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is 
illegal, oppressive, fraudulent, or unfairly prejudicial to 
the petitioner, whether in his capacity as shareholder, 
director, or officer of the corporation; 
. . . or 
(3) there exist grounds for judicial dissolution of the 
corporation under [s]ection 33-14-300[7]. 
(b) A shareholder must commence a proceeding under 
subsection (a) in the circuit court of the county where the 
corporation's principal office or, if none in this State, its 
registered office is located. The jurisdiction of the court 
in which the proceeding is commenced is plenary and 
exclusive. 
(c) If a shareholder has agreed in writing to pursue a 
nonjudicial remedy to resolve disputed matters, he may 
not commence a proceeding under this section with 
respect to the matters until he has exhausted the 
nonjudicial remedy. 
 
S.C. Code Ann. § 33-18-400 (2006). 
 
(a) If the court finds that any grounds for relief described 
in [s]ection 33-18-400(a) exist, it may order one or more 
of the following types of relief: 
(1) the performance, prohibition, alteration, or setting 
aside of any action of the corporation or of its 
shareholders, directors, or officers of or any other party 
to the proceeding; 
7 Those grounds include "(ii) the directors or those in control of the corporation 
have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal, fraudulent, oppressive, 
or unfairly prejudicial either to the corporation or to any shareholder (whether in 
his capacity as a shareholder, director, or officer of the corporation)" and "(iv) the 
corporate assets are being misapplied or wasted."  S.C. Code Ann. § 33-14-300(2) 
(2006),
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(2) the cancelation or alteration of any provision in the 
corporation's articles of incorporation or bylaws; 
(3) the removal from office of any director or officer; 
(4) the appointment of any individual as a director or 
officer; 
(5) an accounting with respect to any matter in dispute; 
(6) the appointment of a custodian to manage the 
business and affairs of the corporation;
(7) the appointment of a provisional director who has all 
the rights, powers, and duties of an elected director to 
serve for the term and under the conditions prescribed by 
the court; 
(8) the payment of dividends;
(9) the award of damages to any aggrieved party. 
(b) If the court finds that a party to the proceeding acted 
arbitrarily, vexatiously, or otherwise not in good faith, it 
may award other parties their reasonable expenses, 
including counsel fees and the expenses of appraisers or 
other experts, incurred in the proceeding. 
S.C. Code Ann. § 33-18-410 (2006).
(a) If the court finds that the ordinary relief described in 
[s]ection 33-18-410(a) is or would be inadequate or 
inappropriate, it may order the corporation dissolved 
under [s]ection 33-18-430 unless the corporation or one 
or more of its shareholders purchase all the shares of the 
shareholder for their fair value and on terms determined 
under subsection (b). 
(b) If the court orders a share purchase, it shall: 
(1) determine the fair value of the shares, considering 
among other relevant evidence the going concern value 
of the corporation, any agreement among some or all of 
the shareholders fixing the price or specifying a formula 
for determining share value for any purpose, the 
recommendations of any appraisers appointed by the 
court, and any legal constraints on the corporation's 
ability to purchase the shares; 
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(2) specify the terms of the purchase, including, if 
appropriate, terms for installment payments, 
subordination of the purchase obligation to the rights of 
the corporation's other creditors, security for a deferred 
purchase price, and a covenant not to compete or other 
restriction on the seller; 
(3) require the seller to deliver all his shares to the 
purchaser upon receipt of the purchase price or the first 
installment of the purchase price; 
(4) provide that after the seller delivers his shares he has 
no further claim against the corporation, its directors, 
officers, or shareholders, other than a claim to any unpaid 
balance of the purchase price and a claim under any 
agreement with the corporation or the remaining 
shareholders that is not terminated by the court;
(5) provide that, if the purchase is not completed in 
accordance with the specified terms, the corporation is to 
be dissolved under [s]ection 33-18-430; and 
(6) provide that the corporation or remaining 
shareholders release or enter into an agreement to 
indemnify the seller from any personal liability for 
obligations of the corporation the seller has personally 
guaranteed. 
S.C. Code Ann. § 33-18-420 (2006).
(a) The court may dissolve the corporation if it finds: 
(1) there are grounds for judicial dissolution under 
[s]ection 33-14-300; or 
(2) all other relief ordered by the court under [s]ection 
33-18-410 or 33-18-420 has failed to resolve the matters 
in dispute. 
(b) In determining whether to dissolve the corporation, 
the court shall consider among other relevant evidence 
the financial condition of the corporation but may not 
refuse to dissolve solely because the corporation has 
accumulated earnings or current operating profits.
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S.C. Code Ann. § 33-18-430 (2006).
In Kiriakides v. Atlas Food Systems & Services, Inc., 343 
S.C. 587, 541 S.E.2d 257 (2001), [the supreme court] 
established how a court should determine whether 
majority shareholders have acted oppressively within the 
meaning of section 33-14-300. . . .  In establishing the 
proper considerations for finding oppression, [the court]
observed that the terms oppressive and unfairly 
prejudicial are elastic terms whose meaning varies with 
the circumstances presented in a particular case.  [The 
court] also noted this was a fact-sensitive review and 
should therefore be determined through a case-by-case 
analysis, supplemented by various factors which may be 
indicative of oppressive behavior.  Although [the court]
declined to set out specific factors in Kiriakides, [it]
observed several commonly considered ones including: 
eliminating minority shareholders from directorate and 
excluding them from employment[,] . . . failure to 
enforce contracts for the benefit of the corporation[, and]
withholding information from minority shareholders.  
Ballard, 399 S.C. at 594, 733 S.E.2d at 110 (second omission by court) (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted). 
In Ballard, the court noted that the minority shareholder, "like [the minority 
shareholders] in Kiriakides, similarly faces prospects of exclusion from the 
business, a slim chance of seeing a return any time soon, and no market in which to 
otherwise unload his investment." Id. at 595, 733 S.E.2d at 110.  The court noted, 
"This result is especially significant because returns on investment in close 
corporations often accrue incident to employment with the corporation as opposed 
to through dividends." Id. at 596-97, 733 S.E.2d at 111 (citing Douglas K. Moll, 
Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations: The Unanswered Question of 
Perspective, 53 Vand. L. Rev. 749, 758 (Apr. 2000) (noting that "the close 
corporation investor typically looks to salary rather than dividends for a share of 
the business returns because the (e)arnings of a close corporation often are 
distributed in major part in salaries, bonuses and retirement benefits" (internal 
quotation marks omitted))).
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Common freeze out techniques include the termination of 
a minority shareholder's employment, the refusal to 
declare dividends, the removal of a minority shareholder 
from a position of management, and the siphoning off of 
corporate earnings through high compensation to the 
majority shareholder. Often, these tactics are used in
combination.  In a public corporation, the minority 
shareholder can escape such abuses by selling his shares; 
there is no such market, however, for the stock of a close 
corporation. The primary vulnerability of a minority 
shareholder is the specter of being locked in, that is, 
having a perpetual investment in an entity without any 
expectation of ever receiving a return on that investment. 
Kiriakides, 343 S.C. at 604-05, 541 S.E.2d at 267 (footnotes, citations, and internal
quotation marks omitted).   
"The application of these grounds for dissolution to specific circumstances 
obviously involves judicial discretion in the application of a general standard to 
concrete circumstances."  Id. at 598, 541 S.E.2d at 263 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  "The court should be cautious in the application of these grounds so as to 
limit them to genuine abuse rather than instances of acceptable tactics in a power 
struggle for control of a corporation." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Although the terms oppressive and unfairly prejudicial 
are not defined in section 33-14-300, the comment to 
[section] 33-18-400 [of the South Carolina Code] (1990), 
which allows shareholders in a statutory close 
corporation to petition for relief on the grounds of 
oppressive, fraudulent, or unfairly prejudicial conduct 
provides:
No attempt has been made to define oppression, fraud, or 
unfairly prejudicial conduct. These are elastic terms 
whose meaning varies with the circumstances presented 
in a particular case, and it is felt that existing case law 
provides sufficient guidelines for courts and litigants. 
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Kiriakides, 343 S.C. at 598, 541 S.E.2d at 263-64 (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  "[I]llegal or fraudulent conduct is not required under section 33-14-
300(2)(ii) . . . .  The concern and focus in shareholder oppression cases is that the 
minority faces a trapped investment and an indefinite exclusion [from] 
participation in business returns." Ballard, 399 S.C. at 595, 733 S.E.2d at 110 (last 
alteration by court) (internal quotation marks omitted).  "Prior to 1963, dissolution 
could be based only upon illegal, fraudulent or oppressive conduct.  In an attempt 
to afford minority shareholders greater protection, the legislature amended the 
statute in 1963 to include unfairly prejudicial conduct."  Kiriakides, 343 S.C. at 
597 n.17, 541 S.E.2d at 263 n.17 (internal quotation marks omitted).  "The statute, 
as amended, broadens the scope of actionable conduct by providing the frozen-out 
minority shareholder a right of action based on conduct by the majority 
shareholders which might not rise to the level of fraud."  Id. (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
The Kiriakides court found:
[W]e do not believe the Legislature intended a court to 
judicially order a corporate dissolution solely upon the 
basis that a party's reasonable expectations have been 
frustrated by majority shareholders.  To examine the 
reasonable expectations of minority shareholders would 
require the courts of this state to microscopically 
examine the dealings of closely held family corporations, 
the intentions of majority and minority stockholders in 
forming the corporation and thereafter, the history of 
family dealings, and the like.  We do not believe the 
Legislature, in enacting section 33-14-300, intended such 
judicial interference in the business philosophies and day 
to day operating practices of family businesses. 
Id. at 599, 541 S.E.2d at 264 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
[S]ection 33-14-300 does not place the focus upon the 
rights or interests of the complaining shareholder but, 
rather, specifically places the focus upon the actions of 
the majority, i.e., whether they have acted, are acting, or 
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will act in a manner that is illegal, fraudulent, oppressive, 
or unfairly prejudicial either to the corporation or to any 
shareholder. Given the language of our statute, a 
reasonable expectations approach is simply inconsistent 
with our statute. 
Kiriakides, 343 S.C. at 600, 541 S.E.2d at 265 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
"When this court is sitting in equity, and thus viewing evidence for its 
preponderance, we are to consider the equities of both sides, balancing the two to 
determine what, if any, relief to give."  Anderson v. Buonforte, 365 S.C. 482, 493, 
617 S.E.2d 750, 755 (Ct. App. 2005).  "The doctrine of unclean hands precludes a 
plaintiff from recovering in equity if he acted unfairly in a matter that is the subject 
of the litigation to the prejudice of the defendant." Soden, 333 S.C. at 568, 511 
S.E.2d at 379. "He who comes into equity must come with clean hands.  It is far 
more than a mere banality.  It is a self-imposed ordinance that closes the door of 
the court of equity to one tainted with inequitableness or bad faith relative to the 
matter in which he seeks relief." Emery v. Smith, 361 S.C. 207, 220, 603 S.E.2d 
598, 605 (Ct. App. 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).  "The decision to 
grant equitable relief is in the discretion of the trial judge."  Soden, 333 S.C. at 568, 
511 S.E.2d at 379. "[T]he equitable defense of unclean hands is available in a 
shareholder derivative action." Straight v. Goss, 383 S.C. 180, 207, 678 S.E.2d 
443, 458 (Ct. App. 2009). In Straight, the court found the minority shareholder's 
"own inequitable conduct came directly to bear on the transactions of which [he] 
now complains."  Id. at 208, 678 S.E.2d at 458.  The court found "the special 
referee did not err in holding the doctrine of unclean hands precluded [the minority 
shareholder] from recovering against the [majority shareholders]."  Id.
In this case, the special referee ruled that Son's suit was improper because it should 
have been filed as a derivative action.8  The special referee's conclusions of law 6, 
8 Generally, suits to recover assets of the corporation must be brought as derivative 
actions. See Brown v. Stewart, 348 S.C. 33, 49, 557 S.E.2d 676, 684 (Ct. App. 
2001). An individual shareholder may bring a direct suit against the corporation 
only when his or her "loss [is] personal and not a loss of the corporation." Todd v. 
Zaldo, 304 S.C. 275, 278, 403 S.E.2d 666, 668 (Ct. App. 1991).  However, 
"[u]nder [sections 33-18-400 to -430 of the South Carolina Code (2006)], in 
closely held corporations, a minority stockholder can maintain an action for 
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7, and 8 all relate to this determination.  The special referee does not specify to 
which causes of action this decision applies.  The referee does specifically state 
"[t]he inaccuracies in the tax returns and any damages that flow from these falsities 
would affect the corporation in its entirety, not . . . Son specifically.  Therefore, 
Son's suit was improper in that it was not filed as a derivative action."  Son does 
not address the special referee's finding his suit should have been filed as a 
derivative action. Therefore, this ruling is the law of the case under the two-issue 
rule. 
As to the merits, this court can make its own findings of fact while keeping in mind 
the special referee saw and heard the witnesses' testimonies.  Based on the 
evidence in the record, Son seems to be the primary party who engaged in illegal 
activities and benefited from those activities.  He received the benefits from his 
casing scheme. He was not re-elected as president of the Company, but was 
elected to serve as vice-president and receive the same salary. He chose to leave 
the Company and as a result to stop receiving a salary and other benefits he and the 
other the stockholders enjoyed, such as a company car and a gas credit card.  He 
was the one stockholder who refused to repay the Company for personal expenses 
such as housekeeping services. Additionally, most of the testimony in the record 
indicates he had knowledge that adjusting the Company's inventory to diminish its 
tax liability was fraudulent.  Based on all of this, the special referee did not err in 
finding he was not an oppressed shareholder.  Accordingly, we affirm the special 
referee's decision to not order the Company buy Son's shares.9 
II. Amount of Shares Owned 
Son contends he has physical possession of thirty percent of the Company's shares 
and is entitled to another twenty percent, which Mother and Father have refused to 
deliver. He maintains the special referee erred in determining he was not entitled 
to the twenty percent of the stock because the agreement providing for such was 
"illegal and unenforceable."  We disagree. 
managerial misconduct and other forms of oppression by majority stockholders."  
Davis v. Hamm, 300 S.C. 284, 291, 387 S.E.2d 676, 680 (Ct. App. 1989). 
9 Accordingly, we need not address Son's arguments regarding valuation.  See
Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 613, 518 S.E.2d 
591, 598 (1999) (holding an appellate court need not review remaining issues when 
its determination of a prior issue is dispositive of the appeal). 
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"An action for breach of contract is an action at law." Electro-Lab of Aiken, Inc. v. 
Sharp Constr. Co. of Sumter, 357 S.C. 363, 367, 593 S.E.2d 170, 172 (Ct. App. 
2004). "An illegal contract is unenforceable.  The general rule is that courts will 
not enforce a contract which is violative of public policy, statutory law, or 
provisions of the Constitution."  Beach Co. v. Twillman, Ltd., 351 S.C. 56, 64, 566 
S.E.2d 863, 866-67 (Ct. App. 2002) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  The court "will not lend its assistance to carry out the terms of a contract 
that violates statutory law or public policy."  Ward v. W. Oil Co., 387 S.C. 268, 
274, 692 S.E.2d 516, 519 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
Son's claim to the stock arises out of the retirement agreement and gift letter he had 
with Mother and Father.  The special referee noted Son's claim was not included in 
his amended complaint.  Further, it found the provisions of the document were not 
complied with as Father could not retire in light of Son's conduct and the additional 
rent payments were stopped.  Additionally, the special referee determined it could 
not enforce "agreements which clearly, on their face, were illegal and 
unenforceable."
Son's argument on appeal does not address the special referee's ruling his claim 
was not pled. As to the agreement's illegality, he simply argues that the result is 
inequitable.  Accordingly, we affirm this issue under the two-issue rule.  See Jones, 
387 S.C. at 346, 692 S.E.2d at 903 ("Under the two[-]issue rule, whe[n] a decision 
is based on more than one ground, the appellate court will affirm unless the 
appellant appeals all grounds because the unappealed ground will become the law 
of the case.").  Further, the evidence supports the special referee's finding Son 
stopped complying with the terms of contract.  Therefore, we affirm the special 
referee's decision.    
III. Fiduciary Duty 
Son alleges the special referee erred in concluding the Masons did not breach their 
fiduciary duty to him.  We disagree. 
"[A] claim of breach of fiduciary duty is an action at law . . . ."  Jordan, 362 S.C. at 
205, 608 S.E.2d at 131. "In an action at law, the appellate court will correct any 
error of law, but it must affirm the special referee's factual findings unless there is 
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no evidence that reasonably supports those findings."  Linda Mc Co. v. Shore, 390 
S.C. 543, 555, 703 S.E.2d 499, 505 (2010) (citation omitted).  
Controlling shareholders owe a fiduciary duty to minority shareholders. 
Clearwater Trust v. Bunting, 367 S.C. 340, 347, 626 S.E.2d 334, 337 (2006).
 "The common law fiduciary duty, first recognized in 1913, owed to shareholders 
by corporate officers and directors has been codified by [sections] 33-8-300 and -
420." Id. at 350, 626 S.E.2d at 339.
(a) An officer with discretionary authority shall discharge 
his duties under that authority:
(1) in good faith; 
(2) with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like 
position would exercise under similar circumstances; and 
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best 
interests of the corporation and its shareholders. 
(b) In discharging his duties an officer is entitled to rely 
on information, opinions, reports, or statements, 
including financial statements and other financial data, if 
prepared or presented by:
(1) one or more officers or employees of the corporation 
whom the officer reasonably believes to be reliable and 
competent in the matters presented; or 
(2) legal counsel, public accountants, or other persons as 
to matters the officer reasonably believes are within the 
person's professional or expert competence. 
S.C. Code Ann. § 33-8-420 (2006).
"[U]nder South Carolina case law, a breach of this fiduciary duty must be pursued 
through a derivative, and not an individual, action."  Rivers v. Wachovia Corp., 665 
F.3d 610, 617 (4th Cir. 2011).
"The fiduciary obligation of dominant or controlling stockholders or directors is 
ordinarily enforceable through a stockholder's derivative action . . . ."  Brown, 348 
S.C. at 49, 557 S.E.2d at 684 (omission by court) (internal quotation marks 
omitted).  "A shareholder may maintain an individual action only if his loss is 
separate and distinct from that of the corporation.  A shareholder's suit is derivative 
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if the gravamen of his complaint is an injury to the corporation and not to the 
individual interest of the shareholder." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  "If 
misconduct by the management of a corporation has caused a particular loss to an 
individual stockholder, the liability for the mismanagement is an asset of the 
individual stockholder.  Of course, a suit based on the misconduct can be brought 
by the individual stockholder."  Id. at 49, 557 S.E.2d at 684-85 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).  "An individual action is also allowed if the alleged wrongdoers 
owe a fiduciary relationship to the stockholder and full relief to the stockholder 
cannot be had through a recovery by the corporation."  Id. at 50, 557 S.E.2d at 685. 
Because this is an issue of law, we must affirm the special referee's findings unless 
no evidence supports them.  The record contains evidence Son perpetrated the 
fraudulent activities. Although Son testified he acted with Accountant's guidance 
and did not know his actions were not proper or legal, the special referee did not 
find Son's testimony credible in these matters.  Several people, including others not 
named as parties in this suit, testified the Masons did not know Son was taking 
actions that were fraudulent. Further, because the fraudulent tax returns impact all 
of the shares equally, Son should have filed a derivative action.  As the testimony 
supports the special referee's decision, we affirm this issue.  
IV. Aiding and Abetting 
Son contends the special referee erred in failing to find Accountant aided and 
abetted the Masons in breaching their fiduciary duties to the shareholders of the 
company.  We disagree. 
Initially, Accountant contends Son did not perfect his appeal as to Accountant 
because he did not name Accountant as a respondent or attach a copy of the order 
regarding his cause of action against Accountant to his notice of appeal.  Although 
he added Accountant as a respondent when he filed his amended notice of appeal 
within thirty days of the order, he did not attach a copy of the order relating to 
Accountant until he filed his second amended notice of appeal, which was more 
than thirty days after the underlying order had been filed.  We disagree. 
"Service of the notice of intent to appeal is a jurisdictional requirement, and the 
[c]ourt has no authority to extend or expand the time in which the notice of intent 
to appeal must be served." Conner v. City of Forest Acres, 348 S.C. 454, 461, 560 
S.E.2d 606, 609 (2002). "Clerical errors in a notice of appeal do not destroy the 
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appeal." Charleston Lumber Co. v. Miller Hous. Corp., 318 S.C. 471, 478, 458 
S.E.2d 431, 435 (Ct. App. 1995). In Charleston Lumber Co., the court rejected the 
respondent's attempt to have the appeal dismissed on jurisdictional grounds when 
the appellant neglected to appeal one of a series of cases tried together.  Id. at 477-
78, 458 S.E.2d at 435-36.  In Weatherford v. Price, 340 S.C. 572, 578, 532 S.E.2d 
310, 313 (Ct. App. 2000), the court found that although the appellant "did not 
'technically' appeal from the trial court's original order by referring to it in the 
Notice of Appeal, the [appellant] did attach a copy of the order to the Notice."  The 
court found the appellant's omission was "of a clerical nature only and this [c]ourt 
has jurisdiction to hear the appeal." Id. In both Weatherford, 340 S.C. at 578, 532 
S.E.2d at 313, and Charleston Lumber, 318 S.C. at 478, 458 S.E.2d at 436, the 
court noted the respondents were not prejudiced by the determination the court had 
jurisdiction over the appeal. 
In Conner, 348 S.C. at 460-62, 560 S.E.2d at 609-10, the supreme court found the 
appellant's correction to her notice of appeal by adding two parties originally listed 
as defendants as respondents was not a clerical error; thus, the court determined 
notice to the two parties was untimely, requiring their dismissal from the appeal.  
The court noted the appellant waited nearly five months after filing the appeal to 
name the two parties as respondents and correspondence between the appellant and 
the court regarding the caption of the notice of appeal should have alerted her to 
the mistake much earlier.  Id. at 462, 560 S.E.2d at 610.
In this case, Chief Judge Few issued an order on March 4, 2013, denying 
Accountant's motion to dismiss.  However, in that order he stated, "[N]othing in 
this order prevents [Accountant] from raising this issue in his brief for the assigned 
panel to consider along with the merits of this appeal." 
Unlike Conner, Son added Accountant as a respondent within the thirty days for 
filing an appeal. Although Son waited longer than thirty days to include the order 
relating the Accountant, he did add the order more timely than the appellant in 
Conner. We find the appeal was proper because Accountant at least had notice he 
was a party to the appeal within the time required to file an appeal from the special
referee's decision.    
The elements for a cause of action of aiding and abetting 
a breach of fiduciary duty are[] (1) a breach of a fiduciary 
duty owed to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant's knowing 
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participation in the breach; and (3) damages.  The 
gravamen of the claim is the defendant's knowing 
participation in the fiduciary's breach. 
Gordon v. Busbee, 397 S.C. 119, 133, 723 S.E.2d 822, 830 (Ct. App. 2012) 
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). 
As discussed above, the special referee did not err in determining the Masons did 
not breach their fiduciary duty to Son.  Accordingly, because no breach of 
fiduciary occurred, Accountant could not have knowingly participated in a breach 
of that duty.  Therefore, we affirm this issue. 
V. Civil Conspiracy 
Son argues the special referee erred in failing to find the Masons engaged in a civil 
conspiracy to loot the Company at the expense of Son.  We disagree. 
An action for civil conspiracy is normally an action at law.  McMillan v. Oconee 
Mem'l Hosp., Inc., 367 S.C. 559, 564, 626 S.E.2d 884, 886 (2006).  "However, the 
character of an action as legal or equitable depends on the relief sought.  When 
equitable relief is sought in an action in tort[,] the action is one in equity."  Soden, 
333 S.C. at 574, 511 S.E.2d at 382.
"The elements of a civil conspiracy in South Carolina are (1) the combination of 
two or more people, (2) for the purpose of injuring the plaintiff, (3) which causes 
special damages." Pye v. Estate of Fox, 369 S.C. 555, 566-67, 633 S.E.2d 505, 
511 (2006). "[I]n order to establish a conspiracy, evidence, direct or 
circumstantial, must be produced from which a party may reasonably infer the joint 
assent of the minds of two or more parties to the prosecution of the unlawful 
enterprise." Id. at 567, 633 S.E.2d at 511 (alteration by court) (internal quotation 
marks omitted). 
Conspiracy may be inferred from the very nature of the 
acts done, the relationship of the parties, the interests of 
the alleged conspirators, and other circumstances.  Civil 
conspiracy is an act which is by its very nature covert and 
clandestine and usually not susceptible of proof by direct 
evidence. . . . An action for civil conspiracy is an action 
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at law; the trial judge's findings will be upheld on appeal 
unless they are without evidentiary support. 
Id. (omission by court) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). 
The gravamen of the tort of civil conspiracy is the 
damage resulting to the plaintiff from an overt act done 
pursuant to the combination, not the agreement or 
combination per se.  [A]n unlawful act is not a necessary 
element of the tort. Because the quiddity of a civil 
conspiracy claim is the damage resulting to the plaintiff, 
the damages alleged must go beyond the damages alleged 
in other causes of action. 
Id. at 567-68, 633 S.E.2d at 511 (alteration by court) (citations and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
The special referee found: 
If the value of Son's stock has indeed been impaired, Son 
need not look further than his own actions in filing false 
and inaccurate tax returns, diverting Company funds 
through the casing scheme, payment of personal 
expenses (including attorney[']s fees) from Company 
funds and working on an expansion of the Company 
business to include (for the first time) Company 
ownership of land and building from which the Conway 
Store is operated, and diverting Company funds for 
operation of a non-company owned entity (BCJ Tires). 
The special referee also found Son did not establish "any special damages arising 
out of the alleged conspiracy." Son did not allege anything in his complaint 
distinct from his other causes of action in his claim for civil conspiracy.  He did 
state the Masons had "conspired to cause special damages to [Son] in such a way 
that [Son] will not receive the fair value of his stock in the [Company] or the 
opportunity to effectively manage the business affairs of the [Company]."
73 

 Son requests actual and punitive damages for the civil conspiracy.  Accordingly, 
this is an action at law, and this court should affirm if the evidence supports the 
special referee's findings. Because the evidence, including the testimony provided 
by the Masons, Accountant, and others, supports the special referee's findings, we 
affirm this issue.   
 
VI. Constructive Discharge 
 
Son argues the Masons violated public policy and wrongfully and constructively 
discharged Son from his employment with the Company.  We disagree. 
 
"An action for breach of contract is an action at law."  Electro-Lab of Aiken, 357 
S.C. at 367, 593 S.E.2d at 172. An action for damages for wrongful discharge is 
action at law.  Wallace v. Milliken & Co., 305 S.C. 118, 120, 406 S.E.2d 358, 359 
(1991). But see id. ("An employee, discharged in retaliation for instituting a 
Workers' Compensation Claim, is entitled to lost wages and reinstatement.  
Reinstatement is equitable relief, payment of back wages being merely an integral 
part of the remedy.  Moreover, lost wages are deemed restitution, itself an 
equitable remedy." (citations omitted)). 
 
"Where the retaliatory discharge of an at-will employee constitutes violation of a 
clear mandate of public policy, a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge 
arises." Ludwick v. This Minute of Carolina, Inc., 287 S.C. 219, 225, 337 S.E.2d 
213, 216 (1985). "Under the public policy exception to the at-will employment 
doctrine . . . an at-will employee has a cause of action in tort for wrongful 
termination where there is a retaliatory termination of the at-will employee in 
violation of a clear mandate of public policy."  McNeil v. S.C. Dep't of Corr., 404 
S.C. 186, 191, 743 S.E.2d 843, 846 (Ct. App. 2013) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 
[T]he public policy exception is invoked when an 
employer requires an at-will employee, as a condition of 
retaining employment, to violate the law. . . .  In a nation 
of laws the mere encouragement that one violate the law 
is unsavory; the threat of retaliation for refusing to do so 
is intolerable and impermissible.   
 
Ludwick, 287 S.C. at 225, 337 S.E.2d at 216. 
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Mother, Father, Sister, and other employees testified that Son stopped working 
voluntarily.  The special referee found the evidence was uncontroverted that Son 
stopped working voluntarily. As an action for breach of contract is an action at law 
and evidence supports the special referee's findings, we affirm.  
VII. Counterclaims
Son argues the special referee erred in awarding judgment to the Masons and the 
Company on their counterclaims.  We disagree. 
"An action for conversion is an action at law." Moore v. Benson, 390 S.C. 153, 
162, 700 S.E.2d 273, 278 (Ct. App. 2010). "Therefore, we review the record to 
determine if any evidence supports the [special referee's] finding."  Id.
Conversion is defined as the unauthorized assumption 
and exercise of the right of ownership over goods or 
personal chattels belonging to another to the exclusion of 
the owner's rights. Money may be the subject of 
conversion when it is capable of being identified and 
there may be conversion of determinate sums even 
though the specific coins and bills are not identified. 
Moore v. Weinberg, 383 S.C. 583, 589, 681 S.E.2d 875, 878 (2009) (citation 
omitted). 
We affirm the special referee's decision to award the Masons and the Company 
damages for their counterclaim for conversion for Son's paying his attorney with 
the Company's funds.  Son retained the attorney to represent himself, not the 
Company.  Additionally, the special referee did not err in finding for the Masons 
and the Company as to their counterclaim for Son's casing scheme.  Based on the 
testimony, Son recorded fake inventory and then paid himself for it.  Accordingly, 
the special referee did not err in finding for the Masons and the Company on their 
conversion claim for the casing scheme. As to the claims for damages as a result 
of Son's filing false tax returns, the special referee did not err in finding a claim for 
the damages from the filing of false returns could be brought later.  The amount of 
damages could not be determined at the time because the Internal Revenue Service 
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had not yet made a determination as to how much the Company owed in back taxes
and fees. 
VIII. Attorney's Fees 
Son contends he is entitled to attorney's fees and expenses.  We disagree. Son 
argues because he should have won his action at trial, he is entitled to attorney's
fees. Because we affirm the special referee's decisions, we have no reason to 
award Son attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
We affirm the special referee's orders. 
HUFF and SHORT, JJ., concur. 
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SHORT, J.:  Andrew T. Looper appeals the circuit court's order, which reversed 
the magistrate court's order dismissing a charge of driving under the influence 
(DUI). Because we find the order is not immediately appealable, we dismiss the 
appeal. 
Looper moved to dismiss the DUI charge prior to his trial in the magistrate court,  
77 

  
 
 
 
   
 
 
arguing evidence, including a videotape of his traffic stop, should be suppressed.  
The magistrate court suppressed the evidence and dismissed the charge.  The State 
appealed the magistrate court's order to the circuit court.  In a Form Four order, the 
circuit court reversed the magistrate court's order, stating, "Magistrate's Order 
granting Defendant's Motion to Suppress was in error and accordingly Defendant's
Motion to Suppress was in error. This decision is reversed and remanded for 
further proceedings." The circuit court denied Looper's motion to reconsider.  This 
appeal followed. 
Looper argues the circuit court's order is appealable because he was aggrieved by 
the order. We disagree. 
"The right to appeal a criminal conviction is conferred by section 14-3-330 
of the South Carolina Code [(1977 & Supp. 2014)]."  State v. Isaac, 405 S.C. 177, 
181, 747 S.E.2d 677, 679 (2013). Our supreme court "has held that, generally, a 
criminal defendant may not appeal until sentence is imposed."  Id. at 183, 747 
S.E.2d at 680. However, in State v. Gregorie, our supreme court found that once 
an appeal is properly before the circuit court and the circuit court "renders its final 
judgment, the right to further appellate review is controlled by statute: Any 
aggrieved party may appeal the circuit court's final judgment."  339 S.C. 2, 4, 528 
S.E.2d 77, 78 (2000) (citing S.C. Code Ann. § 18-1-30 [(2014)] & S.C. Code Ann. 
§ 18-9-10 [(2014)]).  The court explained the test is whether the party appealing 
from the circuit court "is aggrieved."  Id.
In Gregorie, the defendant was convicted in the magistrate court for speeding, and 
he appealed to the circuit court. Id. at 3, 528 S.E.2d at 78. The circuit court 
reversed the conviction and remanded to the magistrate court for a new trial, 
finding the State failed to offer evidence of the applicable speed limit.  Id.  In 
reviewing the defendant's right to appeal the circuit court's order, the supreme 
court held that the exception created by this court, "permitting a criminal defendant 
to appeal a circuit court order remanding his case to magistrate's court for further 
proceedings if the issue is whether such proceedings would violate the defendant's 
double jeopardy clause," was not the test in determining appealability.  Id.  Rather, 
the issue is "whether the party bringing the appeal is aggrieved."  Id. at 4, 528 
S.E.2d at 78. The court further stated: 
On the merits, the issue is simple.  The circuit court 
found the State failed at trial to meet its burden of proof, 
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and ordered a new trial. The State did not appeal the 
insufficient evidence finding, and therefore, whether 
correct or not, it is the law of this case. Petitioner 
contended, correctly, that under these circumstances a 
second trial in magistrate's court would violate his 
Double Jeopardy rights. 
Id. (citation omitted).  Thus, because a new trial would have violated Gregorie's
double jeopardy rights, he was aggrieved.  Id.
Looper has not been convicted and is not similarly aggrieved; therefore, we 
examine the definition of "aggrieved."  In Cisson v. McWhorter, 255 S.C. 174, 178, 
177 S.E.2d 603, 605 (1970)(quoting Bivens v. Knight, 254 S.C. 10, 13, 173 S.E.2d 
150, 152 (1970)), our supreme court stated:
The issue of who is a party aggrieved is not one of first 
impression for our court . . . .  "[W]e [have] held that an 
aggrieved party is one who is injured in a legal sense; one 
who has suffered an injury to person or property.  A good 
definition of an aggrieved party is contained in the case 
of Bowles v. Dannin, 62 R.I. 36, 2 A.2d 892 [(1938)]. It 
is there stated that an aggrieved party within [the] statute 
relating to appeals is a person who is aggrieved by the 
judgment or decree when it operates on his rights of 
property or bears directly upon his interest, the word 
aggrieved referring to a substantial grievance, a denial of 
some personal or property right or the imposition on a 
party of a burden or obligation." 
We do not find Looper has suffered an injury; therefore, we find Looper is not 
aggrieved. We analogize the order in this case to an order denying a motion to 
suppress evidence, which is an interlocutory order that is not immediately 
appealable. See State v. Hubbard, 277 S.C. 568, 569, 290 S.E.2d 817, 817 (1982) 
(finding the appeal from the denial of a motion to suppress evidence is 
interlocutory); see also State v. Isaac, 405 S.C. 177, 184, 747 S.E.2d 677, 680 
(2013) (analogizing the denial of a request for immunity under the Protection of 
Persons and Property Act to the denial of a motion to dismiss a criminal case on 
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the ground of double jeopardy and finding it not immediately appealable).  
Accordingly, Looper's appeal is 
DISMISSED. 

HUFF and KONDUROS, JJ., concur. 
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